

23 May 1946

REstricted

MEMORANDUM

To: General Groves.  
Subj: History Psychological Warfare, Manhattan Project.

1. At the request of Mrs. O'Leary, information on subject phase of Manhattan Project's history is herewith submitted. Since the format of the history is unknown to the undersigned, this information is being submitted informally for rewrite into the proper form. Delay in submitting this was due to the necessity of having to send to New Jersey for the enclosed leaflets, which unfortunately are no longer available in the number requested.
2. By a classified cable, General Arnold to General Spaatz, information copy to General Farrell at Tinian dated 7 August, 1945, (copy available in Manhattan records) General Farrell was charged with the implementation of a program of psychological warfare against the Japanese in connection with the new weapon. The Army Air Forces was instructed to lend all assistance. An informational copy was sent to CINCPAC.
3. General Farrell received the cable as he was boarding a C-54 Green Hornet at Tinian with a group including Rear Admiral Purnell, Captain Parsons, Colonel Tibbetts and others. Purpose of the trip was to report to Admiral Nimitz on the Hiroshima strike.
4. General Farrell enlisted the aid of the Advanced Unit of CincPac Psychological Warfare which was in the direct charge of Lieutenant Robert Morris, USNR. Liaison was promptly

established at Saipan, USASTAF setting up special flights to facilitate details. At Saipan, Mr. Richard Harris who was in charge of OWI's Radio Saipan and the printing press at Saipan, met with Lt. Morris and General Farrell's representative. Production potentials were estimated and the basic plans, subject to General Farrell's approval and determined by the media at hand, were outlined. Inventory of T-3 leaflet bombs and paper available was accomplished. Decision was made to use half-size leaflets in order to double distribution. A second conference followed with Lt. Col. Crocker Snow, A-2 of the 73rd Wing, based at Saipan which had had in addition to its combat schedule the function of leaflet distribution over Japan. At that time the distribution program was formulated. The decision was made, subject to General Farrell's approval, to attempt distribution of 6,000,000 leaflets. The question of selecting targets was a very real problem which demanded lengthy analysis of enemy population concentrations. The arbitrary conclusion called for 60 per cent saturation of enemy cities with a population exceeding 100,000. These totaled 47.

5. Problem of what to tell the enemy was the next order of business. Lt. Morris drew up a draft with an assistant, Ensign Sheehan. This entire program was of top priority and the time element was the dominating factor. Therefore, work on the project, which actively began on the evening of the 7th of August, progressed straight through the night. In addition to the above, there was a midnight conference with Brigadier General O'Donnell's operation people. General O'Donnell was in command of the 73rd wing. This conference developed a certain reluctance to fly

single B-29's over the Empire, reluctance arising from the fact that enemy opposition to single flights was expected to be increased as the result of the total damage to Hiroshima by one airplane. At that time knowledge of the two accompanying observer B-29's was extremely limited as was all knowledge of the combat use of the new weapon except for the barest details. As a sidelight, intense interest was encountered by the few Manhattan personnel in the theater. In the course of setting up the psychological plan this was at times a positive obstruction.

6. On the morning of 8 August, after a flight from Saipan at dawn, the entire plan was presented to General Farrell at Tinian who edited the copy of the proposed message to the enemy and promptly approved it. The text was immediately flown to Guam where it received the Army Air Forces and Navy approval, required by General LeMay and by Admiral Nimitz. By interisland telephone from Guam to Saipan, a difficult method of communication at that time, Radio Saipan was notified to implement the radio aspects of the plan which called for broadcast of the message to the enemy every fifteen minutes. No record of the actual time this began is available here. It is respectfully suggested, however, that this point of information plus the basic documentation of the entire psychological warfare plan is available in Manhattan Project records in the form of several progress cables and a final report cabled by General Farrell to General Groves.

7. Three Japanese officers in the prisoners' stockade at Guam were detailed to the task of making the message calligraphic (clear copy attached) with Japanese translations. As a result



of questioning the Japanese captives who held the equivalent rank of captain and first lieutenants, it was decided to attempt a presentation new to psychological warfare: an objective, factual reportorial piece of the fate of Hiroshima with a photograph of the bomb burst. Format of an existing psychological warfare Japanese language newspaper, a weekly, was utilized.


(Copy attached).

8. Two problems were met and solved. By midnight flight from Saipan to CINCPAC at Guam, priority unloading of T-3 leaflet bombs which ran low was effected. Russia's entry caused a second leaflet edition, combining the atomic bomb use with the Russian move. Unfortunately, clear text for this second piece is not available.

9. Sequels to the atomic psychological warfare were the fact that distribution was not coordinated with the Nagasaki strike causing Nagasaki to receive its quota of leaflets the day after it was hit and a subsequent analysis of effectiveness of total Japanese psychological warfare reportedly placed this campaign second only to the Army Air Forces technique of naming targets before strikes were accomplished. (Source unknown).

10. The above includes basic details, submitted by the undersigned as material for Manhattan Project's history. Continued cooperation on this subject, which can be better told by General Farrell, is assured.

Respectfully,

  
J. F. MOYNAHAN  
Lt. Col., AC







TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:

America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.

We are in possession of the most destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29's can carry on a single mission. This awful fact is one for you to ponder and we solemnly assure you it is grimly accurate.

We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland. If you still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that city.

Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you now petition the Emperor to end the war. Our President has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender: We urge that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and peace-loving Japan.

You should take steps now to cease military resistance. Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war.