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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Saturday, January 10, 1976

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 o'clock
p.m., at Eglin Air Force Base, Fort Walton, Florida.

Present: Frederick Baron, Professional Staff Member.
STATEMENT OF E. HOWARD HUNT

ACCOMPANIED BY: RANDALL COLEMAN

Mr. Baron. Mr. Hunt, as we were discussing off the record, we have to start with some formalities, namely, advising you of your rights.

As you surely must know, you have a right to counsel and you are appearing here with your counsel, Mr. Randall Coleman here.

Is that correct?

Mr. Hunt. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have the right at any point to cease answering questions and consult with your counsel?

Mr. Hunt. I am aware of that right.

Mr. Baron. Are you further aware that you have all of your constitutional rights intact before the Committee, including your Fifth Amendment privileges?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I'm aware of that.

Mr. Baron. Finally, as we were discussing off the record, we are taking your testimony today in contemplation of having you swear to it as soon as possible after we are done. There is no Senator present here today and you are free to stop answering questions or to inform us that you are answering in a manner that you consider to be not under oath at any point that you would like to make that clear.
But I would like to get your consent now to answer questions in contemplation of swearing to them.

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Under the rules of the Committee, you have the right to make a preliminary statement and you might also want to make any closing statement that you have at the end of our session tomorrow. But I see that you have a prepared statement, and why don't you read that into the record?

Mr. Hunt. I do. Do you want me to read it into the record formally or simply pass it over?

Mr. Baron. Well, we can submit it as an exhibit. Let's mark this statement, which is headed "Statement by E. Howard Hunt," as Hunt Exhibit 1.

(The document referred to was marked as Hunt Exhibit 1 for identification.)
Mr. Hunt. And you witnessed my signature. I just signed it before you.

Mr. Baron. It's signed E. Howard Hunt, January 10, 1976, and was just signed in my presence.

Because the first subject that I would like to inquire into is your interview with John Crewdson of the New York Times relating to Colonel Boris Pash, may I ask you to read into the record now just as an introduction this paragraph that relates to that New York Times interview, the paragraph of your preliminary statement.

This is on page 2.

Mr. Hunt. I read from my prepared statement on page 2.

It is the first full paragraph on that page.

"In December, 1975, John Crewdson of the New York Times interviewed me in prison. He asked if I knew anything about 'CIA assassination capabilities,' and I related to him my encounter with Colonel Boris T. Pash. Mr. Crewdson then inquired whether the Church Committee had interviewed me. I responded in terms of the foregoing noting that I would have testified about the Pash encounter had I been given the publicized opportunity. My interview with Mr. Crewdson was published and shortly thereafter my attorney was contacted by a representative of the Committee."

Mr. Baron. I think the place to start is I'd like to give you a fairly open-ended chance to put on this record the
the same story that you gave to John Crewdson and why don't we first introduce the Crewdson story as Exhibit 2, which is entitled "Hunt Says CIA Had Assassin Unit," and is dated December 26, 1975.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 2.)
Mr. Baron. Why don't you give me an account in your own words now of this allegation that there was a small unit set up to arrange for the assassination of suspected double agents at the CIA, which was headed by Boris Pash.

Mr. Hunt. Very well. I will have to go back considerably in time to the period in 1954 and early 1955 when I was a staff officer of the Southeast European Division of the Central Intelligence Agency.

My title was Chief of Political and Psychological Warfare for Southeast Europe. As such, I had a staff responsibility to the Chief of the Division for all political and psychological warfare matters that involved the following countries: Albania, Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Trieste, and Bulgaria.

I have a rough sketch of the division organization at that time, and I don't know if you want to make an exhibit of it, but it's at least something that we can refer to for clarification purposes.

Mr. Baron. I think this is helpful and why don't we, with your permission, introduce as Exhibit 3 and then Exhibit 4 the two charts that you have prepared.

Exhibit 3 would be headed "SE division."

Mr. Hunt. Table of Organization is what it is.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 3)
Mr. Baron. And Exhibit 4 is headed PB Staff, and PB stands for --

Mr. Hunt. Political and Psychological.

Mr. Coleman. No objection.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 4)
Mr. Hunt. I'm sorry I can't be more precise about the year but it's now about 20 years ago that this all occurred. I was of course in daily contact with the chiefs of the various country branches and it came to my attention that we were having considerable difficulty with our Albanian guard unit, I believe it was called, which was then located in West Germany.

This guard unit had been drawn largely from the retainers of King Zog of Albania. We had been the division, the Agency in fact, had been encountering a lot of difficulty with losing agents, Albanian agents who were parachuted into the area. And as a result of the rapid disappearance of our parachuted agents, it became a matter of some concern to the Division.

To the best of my recollection, the presence of a double agent or a penetration agent in the Albanian guard unit was suspected, if not assumed.

To that end there was some discussion, the details of which are no longer clear to me about the best way to cleanse the unit of whatever offending individual there might be, the penetration agent. And I don't recall whether I was specifically commissioned to look into the method of cleansing or whether it was a matter of my personal interest.

But in any event, I inquired around among knowledgeable people in the Agency and it came to my attention, and I hate, again, to be so indefinite, although I will speculate on who
might have directed me to this particular unit. I was told that somewhere within the overall political and psychological staff there was located a man with a small office. This man's name was Pash, Colonel Boris Pash, and my understanding was that Colonel Pash had been doing business, let us say, with the Agency in West Germany for quite a while. I sought out Colonel Pash. I was directed to his office and found sitting with him another Agency officer named Mr. Baron. It's a Greek name. is his correct first name, but he goes by Mr. Hunt. Very good. But in any case, he was known throughout my career as And I was at that point on, let's say, a search mission to determine whether the alleged capability of Colonel Pash in "wet affairs," which is how it was referred to, that is liquidations, would have any relevance to our particular problem of the Albanian disappointments.

Mr. Baron. By liquidations, you mean assassinations?

Mr. Hunt. Assassinations. Assassinations, kidnappings, removals, let's say.

This had been alleged to me. So I spoke to Colonel Pash in Mr. presence. I explained the problem to him, although at that juncture I'm quite sure that we had not identified the Albanian suspect. So we were talking hypothetically,
And I might say parenthetically at this juncture that it became clear many years later that the actual informant was Kim Philby, the British MI-6 Chief who was keeping everyone apprised of our Albanian activities.

So in fact we had no nominee for Colonel Pash's special attentions. However, I broached the problem on a hypothetical basis to Colonel Pash, who seemed to, he didn't pick up on it immediately. He seemed a little startled at the subject. He indicated that it was something that would have to be approved by higher authority and I withdrew and never approached Colonel Pash again.

Mr. Baron. Where did this take place?

Mr. Hunt. This took place in Colonel Pash's office, which, to the best of my recollection, was in the complex in the old JKL series of CIA buildings along the reflecting pool. They have since been demolished.

And in Exhibit 4 here I give a breakdown, to the best of my recollection, of the PP staff at that time, which we can go into.

I don't want to really interrupt the continuity of what I have to say, but just for clarification, so everybody will know what we're talking about and who was situated where at that time. Then I can go into that apart from this, if that's all right with you.

I should also say, and I'm sorry I didn't mention this
earlier, that when I first inquired around for the location of Colonel Pash and his assistant, the reaction I encountered was a rather jesting one, and the impression I gained was here were a couple of men who were drawing salaries and doing very little.

And so when Colonel Pash seemed reluctant to become involved in responding affirmatively to my questions, my inference was that Colonel Pash and could well not have such a capability but for purposes of employment and status, this was the job they had. But they didn't want anyone to call upon them to activate their particular abilities.

Now that was my impression, and I was a little disgusted by it. I think I talked to the Chief of the PP staff later, who was of course well aware of the Albanian problem and I said I didn't get any satisfaction from Pash, but it doesn't really make any difference because we don't have the name of the suspected individual.

Mr. Baron. Just to stop here for a second and clear up some of these details, were you under the impression that what you called wet affairs, assassinations, kidnappings, or other removals from the scene of troublesome individuals was the primary function of this unit that Pash and were running?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact the only. As far as I knew, they
1. had no other function. If they had another function, I was never made aware of what it was.

2. Do you know anything about Colonel Pash's background?

3. Mr. Baron. I know a bit, but if you think that there are relevant details to put on the background, go ahead.

4. Mr. Hunt. Well, I had not thought of Colonel Pash for years until I began reading a book called "Lawrence and Oppenheimer," and I saw quite a few references to Colonel Pash. I had known previously that he had been associated during the war with the Manhattan Project and that he had a security background. And as I believe I touched on briefly before, it was my impression that Pash had been active a couple of years at least before I knew him in West Germany with the sort of thing that we had been discussing so far today.

5. Mr. Baron. What kinds of stories had you heard about Pash's previous activities?


7. Mr. Baron. And where were those?

8. Mr. Hunt. West Germany and West Berlin.

9. Mr. Baron. Do you know the names of any of the victims of the kidnapping or any of the people involved other than Pash and

10. Mr. Hunt. I do not.

11. Mr. Baron. And are you aware from whatever source of any assassination planning or attempts that Pash was involved
Mr. Hunt. I am not.

Mr. Baron. Does your answer include not only the period of time before you talked with Colonel Pash but after you talked with Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.

I might add that I was rather briefly at CIA headquarters at that time and within a very short period of time after I had had my interview with Colonel Pash, I was transferred to the Guatemala project, the overthrow of Guatemala.

Mr. Baron. Is that the reason why you did not follow up on the problem with this particular suspected double agent after not receiving satisfaction from Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. That certainly could have been one reason. On the other hand, I was chief of, I can see I'm really going to have to get into a lot more here. This is going to be dry and dull stuff for you.

who was very upset about the disappearance and loss of all of his partisans in the operations that the Agency was conducting - the counter-intelligence or espionage aspect, which is not my function, but
Why were they being parachuted to their deaths in Albania? And that was my introduction to the whole scene in West Germany, where the balance of his retainers were being held by the CIA. Well, not being held, but where they were being housed and trained for Albanian operations.

Mr. Baron. Can you explain the term "retainer"?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I understood that when he finally got out of Albania, that he brought with him what I can best describe as retainers. That is bodyguards, members of his personal staff, probably some relatives. I think he had four or five sisters with him. But the able-bodied portion of those loyalists who came out with him we had largely taken over. And then he never saw them again. He naturally became apprehensive.

So that was my interest in what was happening to the Albanians that we parachuted in. I had no functional counter-espionage interest in the affair. This would have been handled and this was handled by the Chief of Counter-espionage for the Division.

Mr. Baron. Who would that have been at the time?

Mr. Hunt. I can't remember at this point.
Mr. Baron. But that would be the person primarily responsible for taking care of this double agent problem?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of what happened with that suspected double agent?

Mr. Hunt. I have no idea because, as I may have indicated previously off the record, it became apparent some years later that the unfortunate fate of our Albanian agents was linked far more closely to the revelations of Kim Philby, the Soviet agent who was in direct liaison with us in Washington and in Great Britain, rather than any penetration, although the possibility of a penetration was of course always there. But I don't think that anybody was ever focused.

Again, I left for Latin American affairs. I left the Division about that time and I really never heard about it again. The Albanian chief, departed for Southeast Asia, and the whole sort of complex of knowledgeable people was broken up through normal transfers and special activities like the Guatemala project.

Mr. Baron. Was knowledgeable about your approach to Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Very likely he was, yes. I don't think I would have discussed anything with Colonel Pash about the matter without talking to about it.

Mr. Baron. Who else would have known that you approached...
Colonel Pash with the idea in mind of seeing if an assassination
or a kidnapping couldn't be arranged?

Mr. Hunt. The then Chief of Foreign Intelligence and
Counter-Intelligence for the Division. And I think now that that
was [redacted] I think he wore both
hats. He had both foreign intelligence responsibility and
the counter-intelligence responsibility. And I might have told
the division chief about it, although it was not, it had not
achieved such stature at that point that I would have
necessarily talked to the Division Chief, who I believe at
that time was John Richardson of later Vietnam fame.

It's also possible that the Division Chief in that era
was John Baker, now deceased, who left that division to
become Chief of the PP staff, and that would have been a
normal follow through for me if I had discussed it with John
Baker, my direct Chief, and then to have discussed it with
him when he was my staff chief in the overall political and
psychological staff.

Mr. Baron. Anyone else who would have known about your
approach to Colonel Pash or about --

Mr. Hunt. Or his function.

Mr. Baron. Yes, that Colonel Pash was considered to have
assassinations as one of his functions.

Mr. Hunt. We had a Colonel Buffington who at that time
was a member of the PP staff, the overall PP staff, and I think
that he would have been knowledgeable about it.

Mr. Baron. Was that Milton Buffington?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. I think he later went on and had a career in the Office of Security. Milton Buffington, yes.

Mr. Baron. Anyone else?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I have the names of three men who unfortunately are dead. I could give those names, though. Mr. C. Tracy Barnes, Mr. John Baker, who I've already mentioned, and

These men were all at one time or another chiefs of the Agency's PP staff.

Another man now living to the best of my knowledge who might well have had knowledge of Pash's function was the then-chief of the Economic Warfare staff of the PP staff and h
There was a man named Gates Lloyd. He later became the Deputy Director for Support of the Agency.

There's a man named who was in the Psychological Warfare Branch of the PP staff. I believe at that time there was an International Organizations Branch which later became the International Organizations Division, then headed by Cord Myer, Jr., and his Deputy at that time was Tom Braden, the now-columnist whose wife has just ascended to the Executive Office Building. There were members of the Labor Branch, and I'm trying to think of that branch of office that was down the hall.

There was a labor branch. The people in there might know. There was a lady lawyer named Carol somebody who was very knowledgeable about what was going on in that area.

Mr. Baron. Knowledgeable about Pash's activities?

Mr. Hunt. Well, in the sense that when you have an adjoining office, you usually pretty much know what the other fellow is doing. Just in that sense, because her function in the labor branch had nothing to do with Pash, to my knowledge.

What I'm trying to do here is to give you sort of a congeries of people alive and dead who would have had contact knowledge, at the very least, of what Pash's function was.

Mr. Baron. Were each of these units referred to as PB with a number following it?
Mr. Hunt. PB?

Mr. Baron. In other words, what they called Planning Branch or Program Branch?

Mr. Hunt. I think that was an earlier designation. I don't really think -- of course I was out of the staff. I started in Frank Wisner's organization.

Mr. Baron. OPC?

Mr. Hunt. OPC. And then went into functional activities rather than staff activities. I think that in the very early days it was like PB-1, or PB/. But I think that in the era we are now discussing, which is five or six years after I had joined the Agency, that by that time they had a verbal designator rather than numerical and digraphed designators.

Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the Agency?

Mr. Hunt. In the fall of '49.

Mr. Baron. Can you describe the place on a larger organization chart of the Agency on this PP staff?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I can. Do you have such a chart?

Mr. Baron. I don't have a chart, but what I want to know is who would the chief of the staff be responsible to?

Mr. Hunt. The Chief of the PP staff -- why don't I just draw this up for you and then we can discuss it for a minute?

(Pause)

Mr. Hunt. In that era following the merger of the Special
Operations and OPC, the staff structure emerged as follows:

Reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans, i.e. Frank Wisner, whose Chief of Operations then was Richard Helms, this is the Clandestine Services Organization. There was our support staff, the PP staff, the Foreign Intelligence staff, the Counter-Intelligence, Counter-Espionage staff, and of course the famous staff "D".

Also reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans were all of the geographical divisions, such as Western Europe, Southeast Europe, Asia, Near East, and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Now at this point Frank Wisner was DDP; Richard Helms was his deputy.

Mr. Hunt. Richard Helms was his Chief of Operations.

Mr. Baron. All right. The Chief of the PP staff was --

Mr. Hunt. Either Tracy Barnes or John Baker or

Mr. Baron. And you were located on the South European --

Mr. Hunt. Southern Europe Division.

Mr. Baron. Who headed that division at that point?

Mr. Hunt. Either John Baker or John Richardson.

So as you see, I had a line responsibility to the Chief of the Southeast Europe Division, as indicated in Exhibit 1. At the same time I had a functional responsibility to the Chief of the PP staff, who was Mr. Barnes or Mr. Baker or
Division had a functional responsibility to the Chief of the
FI staff.

Mr. Baron. And Colonel Pash would have been directly
responsible to the Chief of the PP staff.

Mr. Hunt. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Now again, your attaching the names that
you did to this chart, is based on your sense of where things
stood in 1954 and '55.

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Coleman. Let me interrupt. I think you may want to
mark that. It has not been marked as an exhibit.

Mr. Baron. Sure. Let's mark as Exhibit 5 the rough
sketch of an organization chart under the DD/P that we have
just been discussing.

(The document referred to was
marked for identification as
Hunt Exhibit No. 5)
Mr. Hunt. Does this satisfy your request?

Mr. Baron. It does, indeed.

Of all of the individuals that you have just mentioned, which ones do you know to your own certainty were clearly knowledgeable of Boris Pash's activities?

Mr. Hunt. ______ would be the first one, and after that I can only speculate. I would have to assume that ______ acquired knowledge of it, but perhaps he acquired knowledge through me. I'm not sure. I have made a list of other people whom I have not mentioned who conceivably, by virtue of personal contact or functional responsibility, might well have been aware of Pash's true functional responsibility within the Agency.

Mr. Baron. Before I ask you to tick off that list, let's make it clear that all of the names, in addition to ______ are names that you have given as people who are likely to have been knowledgeable of Pash's activities because of their place in the organization structure at that time.

Mr. Hunt. That's correct, or as I have indicated in some cases, as with the PP labor branch by virtue of physical proximity to that office.

Mr. Baron. Okay. Why don't you now just run very briefly through the names of other people who you think could conceivably have been knowledgeable of Pash's function?

Mr. Hunt. In some cases I'm going to have to give you their
title designation rather than the name of the individual because so much time has passed, I have simply forgotten who it was in that particular era.

who at that time was a member of the German branch of the Western Europe Division, he has since retired and is running his family’s business in New York. Certainly the then Chief of Western Europe Division, of which Germany was a functional part and the Chief of Operations of Western Europe should know.

I would think that Jim Angleton, who would have had direct knowledge and always was the Chief of the CI/CE staff. The Chief of base if in fact Pash conducted any activities in that area, certainly the Chief of base in would have been knowledgeable about it.

Also, the Chief of base at which was where we had the operation going on. I don’t know whether Bill Harvy, that is William Harvy, at that time was Chief of Operations or whether he was simply running the tunnel, but Harvy might well have some knowledge of Pash.

I would certainly assume that when we’re talking about liquidations and that sort of thing that the Agency’s overall Office of Security somewhere within it must have been involved, such German Division personnel as might be available today, West German, and I would also suggest that General Cushman might be knowledgeable for this reason.
It was about that time that General Cushman was still assigned to the CIA. I could be wrong about that but I seem to have a memory of Cushman being around in those days. He was then a Colonel. I had associated with him. In fact, we had shared an office at one time, but that was several years earlier. I would place it about early 1949. But I'm quite sure that Cushman was around in that period of time and involved with the PP staff, though what his function was I don't know.

Now there are alive two close friends of mine who were then members of the PP staff. These are men who in effect established the PP staff for Frank Wisner and then left to go on to other things. They are both well known writers.

Mr. Baron. Let me just return to one name that you mentioned and that is William Harvey.

Did you -- first, generally, what was the nature of your operational relationships to William Harvey after this period?

Did you have any?

Mr. Hunt. I never had any, no. In fact, I've only seen him once in my life, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Baron. As you may know, William Harvey was tasked in 1961 with setting up an executive action capability at the CIA, tasked originally by Richard Bissell to carry out assassinations if required.
Do you have any knowledge from any source of any connection between what Harvey was doing in the early '60s in relation to assassination attempts or executive action capabilities and what General Pash was doing in the '50s, according to your story?

Mr. Hunt. No, I can't draw any relationship, really, although, if I can strain your patience a little, I would like to go, to just simply refer to an incident that I recorded in my book, "Give Us This Day," which had to do with the Bay of Pigs, in which following my survey trip to Havana in late '59 or early '60, I had made a number of recommendations for Bissell and Barnes and the top one was that consideration be given to having Castro assassinated and I appended the remark that this was a job for Cuban patriots.

I would like to dilate a bit on that because it never occurred to me that the Agency did not have an assassination capability. This perhaps was as a result of my earlier contact with Colonel Pash or what I heard about him, and that is another reason why I indicated in my written report that this was a job for Cuban patriots.

In other words, I was making a clear distinction. I was saying to Mr. Bissell, I don't feel this is something that one of our people ought to do because there are plenty of people who are available on the outside.

And then if I can just go on a bit to what happened with that
I asked Mr. Bissell at a later time if any action was being taken on my recommendation, and particularly on my first recommendation.

Mr. Baron. The assassination recommendation?

Mr. Hunt. The assassination recommendation, yes. And he told me, he said, well, that's in the hands either of a group or the group. And at this distance in time I simply can't tell what it was he said.

But my understanding was at that point contemporaneously that the matter was being looked into and taken care of and indeed, following some of the testimony that I've since read as a result of the Church Committee hearings, it's my understanding that the matter was in hand long before I made my survey trip to Havana.

Mr. Baron. I glanced at your book briefly, and I saw that passage and I recall that it says that the response you received was that it was in the hands of a special group.

Is that your recollection?

Mr. Hunt. I'm glad to have you refresh that. You're quite right. Of course that brings me to the problem now of knowing whether Bissell meant the special group.

Mr. Baron. Which would be a sub-unit of the National Security Council.

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Did you at the time know whether that was what
he was referring to?

Mr. Hunt. No, I did not. But obviously, my memory of events was a lot better in say 1967 than it is now in 1976.

Mr. Baron. Was there anything that you learned after that interchange that led you to believe that he was referring to the Special Group of the NSC?

Mr. Hunt. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever learn any more about the group that he was referring to that had assassinations in hand?

Mr. Hunt. Not specifically. I was made aware of during my numerous trips back to Washington from the Miami area where I was based during the Cuba operation, that attempts were going ahead, were moving forward to kill off Castro.

I was told, for example, about the box of poison cigars. I knew about that. I heard collaterally, I think, from someone in the paramilitary side that a bazooka had been furnished to some Cuban patriotic team as well as telescopic rifles. But this was not my bag. I had no functional responsibility for it. Everything was handled on a need to know basis and I never inquired further into those matters.

Mr. Baron. What names did you know as being associated with the bazooka incident?

In other words, who were the CIA personnel and who were the Cubans involved?

Mr. Hunt. I have no idea. I would hazard one guess --
Rip Robertson, who I believe is dead. It was sort of his type of thing.

Mr. Baron. But that's strictly a guess?

Mr. Hunt. That's a guess, yes.

Mr. Baron. On the telescopic rifles, do you know who was supplying them on the CIA side and who was receiving them on the Cuban side?

Mr. Hunt. I don't know and I ought to say parenthetically that I was not aware that Bill Harvey at that juncture had anything to do with the Cuban operations. I don't think it was until after the failure of the Bay of Pigs that he surfaced as the Chief of sort of the pick-up unit that I became aware that he had any Cuban involvement at all.

Mr. Baron. So you were never aware of a plot to use poison pills against Castro?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. On the poison cigar scheme, do you know anyone who was involved with that?

Mr. Hunt. I don't know anyone. I think that Gerard Droller told me about it during one of my trips to Washington.

Mr. Baron. Where was he at the time?

Mr. Hunt. He was my back-up man in Washington. He was the Chief of Political Action for the Cuba project.

Mr. Baron. Were there any other specific assassination plans that you were knowledgeable of?
Mr. Hunt. With regard to Castro?
Mr. Baron. With regard to Castro.
Mr. Hunt. No. Well, I'll answer your question no. I
will then go on to say that in the exile milieu in which I
was living in Miami for those many months, and also travelling
as frequently as I had to into Mexico and Guatemala, that
you could hardly draw a breath or smoke a cigarette without
hearing about some project. And people would come up to you
and say, so and so will do the job if he can just get the
necessary --
But this sort of thing I kept far, far away from because
our political action activities at that time were so urgent
that we needed unification rather than anything that might
possibly split the Revolutionary Democratic Front, that I
did not want to involve myself or any of my Cuban proteges
in anything like that.
What they did on their own outside office hours I felt
was up to them. But I never encouraged anyone to do it because
as I say, Bissell had assured me that the matter that I had
recommended was in the hands of a special group or the special
group.
So I thought no more about it.
Mr. Baron. Did you ever plan or mount any action toward
assassinating Castro?
Mr. Hunt. No, I did not. That was not a functional
responsibility of mine. I had a political action responsibility. Anything in that line would have been under the para-military group, Colonel Hawkins and those people.

Mr. Baron. While we are out on this limb away from the details of the Pash story, let's follow up for a minute.

Were you knowledgeable about any assassination planning or the mounting of any assassination operation against other foreign leaders than Castro?

Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any assassination planning or assassination action against any domestic political leaders?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any planning or action toward the targeted killing of any other specific individuals by the CIA?

Mr. Hunt. Let me just take a moment to reflect on that. Now let's see, who have you covered so far in your hearings? You had Lumumba and Castro and Trujillo. Well, I knew that was going on. That was an ongoing thing for a long, long time.

Mr. Baron. You're referring to Trujillo?

Mr. Hunt. Trujillo, yes, because of my intimacy with Latin American affairs.

Mr. Baron. Were you knowledgeable of the plots to kill
Lumumba?

Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

Mr. Baron. Let me just give you a list of names that have been suggested from time to time -- Ho Chi Minh.

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Chou En Lai.

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Chaing Kai Shek.

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Nasser.

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. You weren't aware of --

Mr. Hunt. I hesitated because of Maguib, who preceded him and of course was overthrown. But no.

Mr. Baron. Here again, I'm not asking about general covert actions to overthrow a government but rather targeted --

Mr. Hunt. Targeted assassinations, yes.

Mr. Baron. Plans or attempts.

What about DeGaulle?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Duvalier.

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Salvador Allende.

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Aside from this list we have just gone through,
are you knowledgeable of any CIA assassination planning or activities against any foreign or domestic leaders?

Mr. Hunt. I am not.

Mr. Baron. Now when you stopped to reflect, I had asked a question that did not involve leaders but involved any planning or action against lower ranking individuals or conceivably individuals who were not even in a government but targeted killing as opposed to general covert actions.

Were you aware of any such things?

Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

Mr. Baron. And this would include any knowledge that you might have of actions or plans to eliminate double agents or suspected double agents?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And I realize I am being painfully meticulous here.

Mr. Hunt. Oh, that's all right. I want you to be. I want you to be painstaking about these things.

Mr. Baron. So aside from the incidents that you had specifically mentioned already where you had knowledge of some assassination plan or activity, you have no other knowledge of CIA assassination planning or activity.

Mr. Hunt. That is correct. Well, assassination, that brings us into -- can we go off the record for a moment?

(Discussion off the record)
Mr. Baron. While we were off the record, we agreed to hold discussion on the allegation of some action against Jack Anderson, because as you have indicated to me, and correct me if I am wrong, it did not involve in your mind assassination.

Mr. Hunt. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. But you did raise with me off the record a question in your own mind about the nature of Dr. Gunn's activities.

Can you just describe whatever you know about any relation between Dr. Gunn's activities and assassination planning or attempts?

Mr. Hunt. Well, we are talking for the record about Dr. Edward Gunn, I believe his name is. He was known in the Agency as Dr. Manny Gunn. He became known to me as sort of the unorthodox, or as an unorthodox practitioner of medicine in the sense that if you needed something, some recherche medical information, you went to Manny Gunn and he provided it.

It develops now that in recent months they say that he knew a good deal more about poisons than I believed him to know. It seems to me when I was talking with Dr. Gunn during my late Agency years, and then again when I interviewed him on another matter, that he had a very substantial knowledge of the unorthodox application of medical science to Agency problems, that particular rubric, and I think I should stop.
because we're going to slop over into this other matter that
Mr. Liebengood wants to talk about tomorrow.

Mr. Baron. Well, why don't we hold off then, except
that for this one question, which is are you aware of any
involvement that Dr. Gunn had in assassination planning?

Mr. Hunt. No, I'm not because I'm just not familiar
with assassination planning. And specifically, for that
reason, I'm not aware of any involvement that Dr. Gunn might
have had.

Mr. Baron. Let's return now to the point of departure,
which was your conversation with Colonel Pash and the events
that led up to it.

Who were your supervisors that gave you the impression
that Colonel Pash was prepared to carry out assassinations?

Mr. Hunt. I wish I could give you a distinct name. I
think I covered that in an impressionistic way by saying that
Tracy Barnes and John Baker, who were at different times
sequentially chiefs of the PP staff, it seems to me that Barnes
was probably the one who indicated that Pash had such a
capability.

I know that I did not get it from and I'm
quite sure that my information did not come from within the
Southeast Europe Division. It must have come accordingly
from the Political and Psychological staff, the contacts there,
and I would have to say Tracy Barnes or John Baker are the
most likely.

Mr. Baron. And neither of those two men are alive today?

Mr. Hunt. That's right.

Mr. Baron. Did whoever gave you the information about Boris Pash indicate to you that there were any other units in the CIA that could take care of such problems by means of assassination?

Mr. Hunt. No. My distinct impression and recollection is the function, if indeed it existed, and I believed it then to have existed as I do today, was centralized or focused in Colonel Pash and

Mr. Baron. Now what would have been the formal title of the unit that Colonel Pash and were running?

Mr. Hunt. If it had one, I never knew it.

Mr. Baron. Can you add any other detail to the record on your talk with Colonel Pash and his reaction to your request that he consider on a general level the planning of an assassination of a suspected double agent?

Mr. Hunt. Well, as I recall it, my conversation with him was a relatively brief one. I stepped in the door, met him, saw who I knew briefly, or at least knew him by sight, and I sat down and I said, we have this problem in the Albanian branch. We may need somebody liquidated in Western Germany. Can you handle it if that day comes, or if it comes to that?
And he seemed a little startled. I have already indicated that. What I'm trying to do now is to refine my thoughts more than I did previously when we were taking sort of a wide swipe at the canvas.

Colonel Pash indicated or said to me that it was a matter that would have to be approved by higher authority and as a relatively low ranking officer in those days, I thought he was probably referring to Frank Wisner. And indeed, he may have. It never got pushed up to Frank Wisner's level because there was ever made.

I left with the impression that Colonel Pash was glad that he wasn't going to have any business for me or that he had successfully deflected whatever approach I might be making to him because it would give him an opportunity to drink more coffee and to draw their salaries from the Agency while affecting to do a job that they were perhaps not equipped to do.

Now again, that impression I had when I left him was at variance with what I had heard before I came in, where I heard he or he at least had been active in West Germany in wet affairs, particularly kidnappings and that sort of thing.

Mr. Baron. And you carried into his office the impression that Colonel Pash was a man who could carry off an assassination
mission if it were required.

Mr. Hunt. If not personally, certainly he could arrange
to have it done. That was my distinct impression.

Otherwise, I would not have sought him out.

Mr. Baron. When you were describing this conversation
earlier, you said it was on a hypothetical basis.

Is it correct that given the description that you have
just enunciated, that you meant by hypothetical basis the
fact that you did not yet have the name of the person you
were after?

Mr. Hunt. That's right.

Mr. Baron. But aside from the name of the target, it
was a fairly specific request. He knew what you were asking
and he knew that there was a real operational problem as
opposed to a hypothetical operational problem.

Mr. Hunt. That's correct. I can't swear, unfortunately,
that I referred to the Albanian problem.

Mr. Baron. But you believe you did refer to --

Mr. Hunt. He knew, of course, that I came from the
Southeast Europe Division, so it could have been any one of
a number of countries there.

Obviously, we would not have asked him to go into Albania
to do the job. It had to be somebody who was outside of the
Iron Curtain countries, presumably, in West Germany where we
had a great many interests in that era.
Mr. Baron. And it's your best recollection that you did say to him that we might need to liquidate someone in West Germany?

Mr. Hunt. That's right, or do you have such a capability?

If we have to get to the point of liquidating a body, a target in Europe or West Germany, which I probably said because I had been informed that he was familiar with that scene and had been active there, is this something that you can undertake?

Mr. Baron. Did he talk at all with you about the operational problems that might be involved in planning such a mission?

Mr. Hunt. He did not.

Mr. Baron. He simply reacted in a somewhat surprised way and did not encourage much discussion of the subject.

Mr. Hunt. He did not and said, that's something that has to be cleared by higher authority.

Now his saying that to me was of course bureaucratically quite appropriate. There was nothing inappropriate in such a response. It neither indicated an enthusiasm for the proposal for that line of work, nor was it a washing of his hands.

I felt that he was just glad that he had to reach for higher authority, that it was a deflection and that he would just as soon not hear any more about it, not because of any moral consideration or anything, but simply from a bureaucratic
point of view. He was comfortable where he was and don't bother me.

Mr. Baron. So the gloss that you put on the event at the time was that he would rather not be bothered to have to go to work and get a difficult mission done as opposed to his having grave doubts about whether assassination was a proper mission for him.

Mr. Hunt. Precisely. And he made it very clear that if anybody was going to get approval for such a thing, it would have to be the people -- that is my division -- that he was not going to go forward. That wasn't his job, but the people proposing such a mission, the division, would have to go and get the necessary approvals, whereupon once that bureaucratic sequence had been accomplished, then that would be up to him to handle.

Mr. Baron. Was it your impression when you left that conversation that it was indeed a function of Colonel Pash's to carry out assassinations like this?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Was there any follow-up?

Mr. Hunt. Albeit reluctantly, because my impression was that he was a man who really didn't want to be disturbed. He was comfortable where he was.

Mr. Baron. Was there any follow-up that you were aware of to this request?
Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss this matter with anyone other than Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. In that context?

Mr. Baron. In the context of assassinations or kidnapping.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I wasn't involved in plotting or planning any kidnappings. Again, I would suggest that I might very well have gone back to [redacted], who was the most interested individual, because he was responsible at the branch level as an operational tool, whereas, I had an overall political responsibility [redacted]. And I have described the background of that, the rubric under which I became interested in the Albanian problem in the first place, and then having talked to Pash, it would have been only natural for me to have said to [redacted] look, I've talked with Pash and he says it will have to be approved by higher authority. Now have you gotten, we don't have a body yet, but when you get a name to put on the target, at that point you will have to carry the ball and take it on up the line.

Mr. Baron. And you never heard anything further about it?

Mr. Hunt. No, probably because I went within, I think, a comparatively few weeks off to the Guatemala operation.

Mr. Baron. Did anyone ever mention it to you, say did [redacted] ever mention it to you again?

Mr. Hunt. No. I next saw [redacted] in Taipei in
End of conversation

End of conversation

it would be about '57 or '58, and I had dinner in his home in Taipei, and I'm quite sure I said at that time, whatever happened to Boris Pash, or what do you hear from Boris?

Now he was a rather unusual individual to say the least, and I don't think told me that he was dead. I don't know who told me that Boris, that Pash died, but whatever he said, it was, well, he was okay the last time I saw him and that was the last time we ever discussed it.

Mr. Baron. And you didn't discuss this request?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Where did you receive the impression that Colonel Pash was dead?

Mr. Hunt. I guess when, either from reading the Lawrence and Oppenheimer book or from the newspapers, from the Crewdson story. I don't think at the first level when I began recalling the story, I don't think I was aware that Boris Pash was dead.

Mr. Baron. In the Crewdson story there is an allusion to the fact that Colonel Pash is probably dead.

Are you saying that that came from Crewdson's research and not from yourself?

Mr. Hunt. Oh, yes, that came from Crewdson's research, not mine.

Mr. Baron. This is more than a minor note on the record, Colonel Pash is not dead.

Mr. Hunt. Oh, good, I thought he was dead.
Mr. Baron. He's alive and I have talked with him recently and as soon as we finish running through your story, I want to feed to you his response to this story, which appeared in the New York Times a couple of days ago, and then get your reaction to that.

Are you aware of any cryptonyms, pseudonyms, or file names that were associated with Pash's operations?

Mr. Hunt. I am not.

Mr. Baron. When I spoke to Tom Coons, your attorney, on the phone and asked him to relay some preliminary questions to you, he came back to me with an account that he said you had given him of the one other conversation that you had had with Boris Pash, where he said you had an encounter in a hallway.

Can you describe that?

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Baron. While we were off the record we discussed briefly the account given to me via your lawyer, which was that you had met Pash in a hallway at some point after initial discussion of this matter and asked him where it stood. And he replied this is very heavy stuff. I must be very selective in talking about it, and you dropped the matter.

Do you have any recollection of such a conversation?

Mr. Hunt. I would say that my attorney, with whom I
spoke rather hurriedly by telephone that occasion, has perhaps misinterpreted what I was trying to get across.

I think that he has combined the elements of two separate things into one. I believe that he asked me whether or not I had ever seen Pash again, and I said, yes, I must have run into him in the hall or sat down in the cafeteria with him. And the other thing is, and I'm glad you brought this up, that Pash did say yes during the one interview I had with him, yes, I have to be very selective. And in any case, that that has to be approved by higher authority.

That is the juncture there, the joining, not when I talked with him later. At this point I have no recollection of talking about this incident with Pash a second time.

Mr. Baron. You said earlier that when Pash referred to higher authority in your mind it probably meant Frank Wisner?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any indication at any point that any higher authority than Frank Wisner --

Mr. Hunt. Would be necessary?

Mr. Baron. Would ever consider the planning of this assassination mission?

Mr. Hunt. I think I see what you're getting at. If I could answer in this way:

Considering my relative level in the Agency at that point and the fact that I'd only been in it for five or six years,
my assumption at that time was that authorization by Frank
Wisner would have been all that would have been required to
proceed with the project had it ever materialized. That is
the Chief of the Clandestine Services.

Now whether Frank would have been required to go to
Allen Dulles, I rather doubt it. I think it is something that
he would have been able to authorize himself.

Mr. Baron. All right. Let me ask you now before we get
into Colonel Pash's version of the story, which we will,
whether it is possible that you are confusing the time periods
here?

So as not to hold anything back from you, Colonel Pash
has said that the time period has to be off because he
retired from the Agency, or left the Agency in probably late
'51. It's possible that it went into 1952. But he wasn't
with the Agency in any capacity after '52. And in fact, his
status was that of a military officer who had been detailed
to the Agency from approximately 1948 to '52.

Now does that affect your recollection in any way of the
period '54 to '55 as the period when your conversation with
Boris Pash took place?

Mr. Hunt. Well, from 1950 to 1953, I was in Mexico

Mr. Baron. And where were you from the time that you
joined the Agency until you went to Mexico?
Mr. Hunt. I was a member of the PP staff.

Mr. Baron. Is it possible that your conversation with Boris Pash about the assassination of a suspected double agent took place in that time period?

Mr. Hunt. I would have to say it's possible, yes.

Mr. Baron. Would you have been dealing with East European problems or --

Mr. Hunt. No, I was dealing with West European problems.

Mr. Baron. I'm sorry. Would you have been dealing with a problem like this one, a problem with a suspected Albanian double agent in West Germany during that time period?

Mr. Hunt. I can't recall having done so. The West European Division had its own PP staff officer and he would have been the one to take it up, whereas my recollection is that this was generated at a later time when I was in the Southeast European Division and had a direct reason to become interested in the matter.

I have to say that it is possible, but I would say maybe 5 percent possible.

Mr. Baron. And you accord so small a possibility to the hypothesis that you actually talked to Pash about this problem in '49 or '50 because you were not involved in operations in West Germany at that point.

Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

Mr. Baron. And at that
point?

Mr. Hunt. No, no. He was not.

Mr. Baron. Where were you in '49 and '50 physically?

Mr. Hunt. Physically I was in the JRK building with the PP staff and my direct supervisor at that time was who I have mentioned earlier.

Mr. Baron. Did you travel to West Germany during that period of time?

Mr. Hunt. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. In the later period, '50, '54, and '55, that you were discussing, did you travel often to West Germany?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. You were stationed in Washington?

Mr. Hunt. I was stationed in Washington and from the period after I left Mexico, which was in, I think, March of '54 for about the ensuing year when I left for the Guatemala project, I was in Washington or the SE Europe Division. So I had that continuous almost year there.

Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that adds to your sense of the probabilities that this conversation took place in '54 and '55?

Mr. Hunt. No. My restructuring is as I have given it to you, my recollections.

Mr. Baron. Okay. Let me ask you the same question in maybe a straightforward manner.
Colonel Pash has testified under oath that the conversation could not have taken place in 1954 or '55. What is your reaction to that?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I would say let's pull his Agency file and see where he was in that particular period.

Mr. Baron. Are you prepared to say that he is lying about the fact that the conversation could not have taken place in '54 or '55?

Mr. Hunt. No, I'm not saying that. I just think that any of us who have been with the Agency for a long period of time, we are now talking about an incident that took place 20 years ago, that one man's impression, he is as likely to cling to his impression of the incident as I am, and we almost have a Rashomon type of situation.

Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we pull out the article.

Were you aware of the functioning of a unit called PB7 in OPC?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I might have been at that time. I can't recall what it was now.

Mr. Baron. Colonel Pash has testified that he did head a small unit in the early days of the CIA called PB7, which was one of 7 units he referred to as planning branches, which had functions much like the functions of the PB staff, as you have outlined them. There was an economic PB, there was one for
political affairs, and his was the 7th, which had less well
defined functions. And was a member of that unit.
Do you recall any dealings that you had in your earliest
period of service with the CIA with PB7, now that I've refreshed
your recollection?
Mr. Hunt. Not as such, no. Does Colonel Pash define
what his functions were in the PB7?
Mr. Baron. Before I answer that one, let me ask you one.
Mr. Hunt. I've been trying to develop a helpful colloquy
here.
Mr. Baron. This is very helpful.
Do you recall any charters that any of those planning
branches had?
Mr. Hunt. At this juncture, no. I was only aware that,
I think mine was PB2. This is when I first went in in 1949
or 1950. I think that was outfit.
Mr. Baron. Colonel Pash described the charter of PB7
as giving PB7 responsibility for such other functions as the
six other units didn't perform.
Does that square with your recollection of what he was
doing in those early days?
Mr. Hunt. Well, you see, I don't associate Colonel Pash
with the very early days. I associate him with a later period,
about three years or five years later.
Mr. Baron. Do you have any specific recollection of Colonel
Pash’s activities in the years 1949 to 1952?

Mr. Hunt. Not at all, no. My only other collateral recollection is that Colonel Pash was said to have come to us. He was recently assigned in Germany and he had come to us from there. That was all that I knew.

Mr. Baron. [Redacted] who has also testified this past week on this subject, said that his recollection of the charter of PB7 was that it gave PB7 responsibility for assassinations, kidnappings and such other functions as higher authority may assign or as were not being performed by other units.

Does that square with the impression that you were given by your superiors of the functions of Colonel Pash’s unit?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. I didn’t even know that [Redacted] was still alive. So then supports my functional recollection, let’s say.

Mr. Baron. Let’s introduce as Exhibit 6 an article in the New York Times dated January 8th, 1976, headed “Retired Colonel Denies Heading CIA Unit for Assassinations.”

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 6)
Mr. Baron. For the record, Colonel Pash is quoted in this as having "denied to Senate investigators an assertion by E. Howard Hunt, Jr. that the Colonel once headed a Central Intelligence Agency unit set up to arrange for the assassination of suspected double agents."

Then the article goes on to say that Colonel Pash is reported to have told the Committee that he had left the CIA and returned to military service during 1954 and 1955. And the story further goes on to quote Colonel Pash as terming Mr. Hunt's assertions, "insidious and completely false."

The article then continues:

"He said he could not recall ever having met or spoken with Mr. Hunt."

And that finally the Colonel said, he was not ever "involved in any assassination planning" between 1949 and 1951.

Let me just ask you generally for your reaction to this version of Boris Pash's story, and first I ought to add for my own purposes for the record that the story did not come from the Committee. Colonel Pash called the New York Times and gave them the story and even his prepared statement was not made public by the Committee. We simply told him that we have never prevented any witness from saying anything they want to to the press. And he took his story to the press.

So now what is your general reaction to his version?
Mr. Hunt. Well, I note that the Colonel has said that he was never involved in any assassination planning between 1949 and 1951.

Now of course in my recollection I put the period of time several years later, and I am always quite suspicious of non-service CIA record for a paramilitary individual. And I could say Lucien Conein, for example, is an individual who was apparently in and out of CIA and military capacity for a long span of time, from my own apparent devotion to the career of foreign service, in the foreign service and out of the foreign service to the Department of Army and back.

So a mere referral to not having been assigned to the CIA at a particular time is something that I think would bear a little looking into, as it did in the case of Colonel Conein.

Mr. Baron. All right. Let me take you through the essential points that Colonel Pash made one at a time. We have already discussed the discrepancy in your accounts of the timing of any such conversation, if it did take place.

Colonel Pash says that he does not recall ever having met you and doesn't think he would recognize you on sight.

Now does that shake in any way your own sense that you met somebody that you are sure was Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. In my recollection, he's a rather short man, probably balding, if not totally bald. He wore glasses and
I'm giving that to you from a ten-minute talk to him 20 years ago.

Mr. Baron. Next, Colonel Pash says it is possible that assassinations was part of the charter of his unit at the CIA PB7 on paper but was never any kind of active function of that unit, nor, he has testified, was he knowledgeable of any assassination planning or activity at the CIA during his service there.

How does that square with your recollection?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I think I indicated in my earlier testimony that what I had heard about Colonel Pash was hearsay, that I had heard that he had been active in Western Germany for the Agency and this was before he came back to Washington in a staff capacity, that he had been able to handle things over there, and now he was the man at headquarters who could handle and arrange this sort of thing. So there may be a distinction. Maybe what I heard about him was totally false. Perhaps he was not involved in that kind of activity but I relate him in memory to West German activity of the type that we have been discussing, rather than to his being frenetically active at headquarters with relation to field operations in West Germany, that he was a guy who could get things done because he had had prior experience in Germany, and of course I have to rest my case there.

That's what I heard about him. I did not go up to him and
say, Colonel Pash, I understand you've had a lot of hits in
West Germany and can you do the same for us? I didn't go into
that. I just said, I've been referred to you for the following
reasons, and I went on into my very brief presentation. He
reacted and I left.

Mr. Baron. As you have testified, you did make it
unmistakably clear to Colonel Pash in that one conversation
that you were suggesting the assassination of a suspected
double agent and inquiring as to his capability to carry -
out such a mission.

Mr. Hunt. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Where does that leave you then in evaluating
the truth of his testimony that no such conversation took place
and that he was never asked to even consider planning an
assassination mission?

Mr. Hunt. I never asked him to plan an assassination
mission. I simply asked if he had the capability and his
response was a deflective one, that it was a matter that would
have to be approved by higher authority.

But I left with no doubt that I had been referred to
the right place.

Mr. Baron. Since we don't have his testimony in front
of us -- it has not been transcribed yet -- I don't want to
accord my own memory greater precision than it deserves. But
if Colonel Pash's testimony can be fairly read to have asserted
with real certainty that no such conversation took place and that even in terms of exploring the possibility of assassination planning or inquiring into the capability for assassination planning, he maintains that assassinations were never raised with him, what do you then have to say about his testimony?

Mr. Hunt. I would have to say that his perceptions and mine were at variance and that we were engaged in some sort of an Aesopian dialogue in which neither of us understood what the other was saying.

I had no other reason to approach him. I had never heard of the man except in that particular context.

Mr. Baron. And there was no other reason for them discussing capabilities for an assassination?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any specific function that Colonel Pash performed with the CIA after the date of 1952?

Mr. Hunt. Well, my recollection is that I saw him in '54 and '55 and that's the only specific function that I can relate him to.

Mr. Baron. Now you have drawn a chart of the PP staff, Exhibit 4, that locates Colonel Pash and on the PP staff.

Is it possible that they served on the PP staff before the date the Colonel Pash gives as his retirement date from the
CIA, which is sometime in '52?

Mr. Hunt. Is it possible? Yes, I believe it's possible because [redacted] was one of the original people in OPC.

Mr. Baron. At what point did OPC merge or was it transformed?

Mr. Hunt. Well, it merged with OSO, I think, in 1953 when I was in Mexico in '53, and I came out of there in, I think, March of '54, I left Mexico. By that time the merger had taken place.

Mr. Baron. So is it possible that this chart could have been a chart of the PP staff as it operated under the OPC structure, the 453?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact, I don't think that there was any particular change from the PB to the PP era.

Mr. Baron. The reason for my own confusion here is that Colonel Pash and [redacted] have both said that at the point when OPC was merged, or at some point shortly thereafter, PB7 was abolished and they don't know what became of it. They say the functions that these seven planning branches performed were scrambled and reorganized and they were never sure exactly who carried through the functions that had previously been assigned to PB7.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I never heard any more about it.

Just for perhaps a bit more clarification, the labor...
unit or branch as it appeared in the PP staff following the merger, that had the same function and the same personnel as let's say whatever PB enumerated or numerical designations. So it's just a question of terminology. I can see that for chronological purposes you are interested in how I recall it, whether I recall it by a PB numerical designation or by -- But since I never knew what the Pash-[redacted] unit was designated, whether it was designated by a word or by a number, it doesn't help me at all. And for that reason I can't be of more assistance to you.

Just go see Colonel Pash. He's in such and such an office down there.

Mr. Baron. Off the record for a second.

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Baron. For the record now, while we were off the record we agreed to continue this session a while to get into one or two other areas. But I have a couple of questions to tag on to the end of this one.

First of all, [redacted] in his testimony to the Committee, said that he had no recollection of a conversation with you where he was present, and you discussed assassination of a double agent, or the planning for such a mission with Colonel Pash and himself.

Do you, even having heard his testimony, still have a clear recollection that [redacted] was present when you
had this conversation?

Mr. Hunt. I do, because to the best of my knowledge and belief, it was the first time that I had met

That is, I had seen him in the corridors, but it was the first time that I was able to append a name to the particular individual who I had come to recognize visually.

My memory is further jogged in this respect, that having identified me as a member of the SE division of the staff, at a later time but not much later, talked to me about the possibility of his being assigned to the SE division;

And my recollection of the conversation is that told me that he was a great friend of and that this friendship should be put to use for the Agency’s benefit, and it could be best done by his being transferred to SE division for ultimate assignment to Athens.

Mr. Baron. Do you have from anything in your experience in the CIA any personal animosity toward Colonel Pash or

Mr. Hunt. On the contrary. I’ve always regarded myself as a friend of, and I only had one contact with Boris Pash. And I have no feeling about him one way or the other except that in his recent book I read about his involvement in the Manhattan Project and I certainly admired his contribution to national security in that era.

Mr. Baron. In testimony, he gave us an
account of an incident when he was stationed at [redacted] and he said that he had written a cable to CIA headquarters outlining a propaganda program because he was involved in propaganda operations at that point. And he said, unbeknownst to him, someone else in his station with the approval of the Chief of Station attached an extra paragraph to this cable which suggested the assassination of Chou En Lai in preparation for the Bandoeng Conference where Chou En Lai was supposed to be an important spokesman on behalf of many Asian nations.

And the way that [redacted] recounted the incident, he knew nothing about the paragraph that had been attached to his cable until the reply came back very strongly in the negative and eventually, a high ranking CIA official came out to reprimand everyone involved in the incident for suggesting assassination.

Do you have any recollection of that incident?

Mr. Hunt. No, I have no knowledge. What year does [redacted] refer to because I was in Tokyo from, oh, about '55 to '56 or '57. And I would have seen most of the traffic that came out of [redacted] in that period of time. But I don't know if -- I know that [redacted] stayed on in [redacted] much after my time in the Far East.

I don't know when the Bandoeng Conference took place. I remember it, of course, but I don't remember the year.
Mr. Baron. It appears to me that the Bandung Conference took place, according to testimony, in 1955 and that the incident he was describing was either in '55 or late in '54.

Mr. Hunt. I had no recollection of it whatever. is not suggesting that is some basis for personal animosity, I trust.

Mr. Baron. No. He did say, though, that you might have had knowledge of that suggestion, although he wasn't sure of it. He said you were involved at that time in a place where you might have seen cable traffic like that.

Mr. Hunt. That's quite right, but I never saw that traffic.

Mr. Baron. Let me pick up one last general question for the moment at least on assassinations.

Do you have any knowledge of even the consideration of assassinations at high levels of the American government?

In other words, we have been using the term higher authority and I would like to use it for the moment now to refer to the level of the DCI or the National Security Council, the President, his close White House advisors, Cabinet officials, and the DCI.

Do you have any knowledge of any people at that level seriously considering assassination planning?

Mr. Hunt. No, none. I think you have to bear in mind
that most of my time with the Agency I was abroad and only
in the few years prior to my retirement when I decided to
retire did I really come back and become a headquarters type.
But the rest of the time in my entire career I was abroad.

The only reference I recall is the one that I have
testified about following my survey trip to Havana when I
provided a list of written recommendations to Dick Bissell
and Ed Barnes in which I recommended the assassination of
Castro by patriotic Cubans, and later on when Bissell said
that the matter was in the hands of a special group or possi-

bly the special group, and I can't discriminate at this
point between the two, was I aware that Bissell himself --
well, I still believe that Bissell himself was sufficient
authority for something like that. I didn't know you needed
to go beyond it. I didn't think it was a matter of the 40
Group or the National Security Council had to become concerned

with.

Mr. Baron. And once again, you were not aware of any
follow-up to your suggestion?

Mr. Hunt. Well, yes. Bissell said the matter -- perhaps,
of course, again, we had the situation where I'm talking about
a suggestion that I made, and I said to Bissell, what about
that recommendation, and he says it's in the hands of the
special group or the special group.

Actually, as we now know, that was a satisfactory answer
to me and I was surprised when on invasion day Castro was alive. I now realize from testimony that Harvey and others have given that the matter had been discussed long before my arrival on the scene and it was in hand one way or the other.

Mr. Baron. When was your arrival on the scene?

Mr. Hunt. Spring of 1960. I transferred up, I actually made my trip to Havana the summer of 1960, and then we had the Bay of Pigs invasion the following April of '61.

Mr. Baron. Now it is my own recollection of our assassination report that no action was taken to carry out an assassination plan against Castro as early as the spring of 1960.

Did something --

Mr. Hunt. No. I've giving you, I guess, a bureaucratic answer. I was officially transferred back to Washington in the spring of 1960 and I took some leave en route in Spain.

Eventually I made my way back to Washington in the spring and early summer and got on the scene within a few days of my actually reporting into the project managers, i.e., Bissell and Barnes, who decided I would go down to Havana for a period of time, and I went down for about a week and came back, and by that time we were talking maybe July or so.

Mr. Baron. July of '60?
Mr. Baron. Was it your impression at that point that assassination planning was under way?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. When did you make this recommendation to Richard Bissell?

Mr. Hunt. Within a few days after my return from Havana. Now I never heard from Bissell about the matter until some months later, and I think I described this in my book, most of which I put together in '67. I described coming back to Washington. I had been aware, coming back from the Miami area where I was operating, I was hearing all of these things about bazookas and telescopic rifles and so forth, and sort of assuming that all of this was a result of the recommendation that I had made. And then Bissell's response to me was, well, what has happened to my recommendation, and he said, well, it's in the hands of the special group.

And from that time on I never inquired further. Subsequently I was told about poison cigars, which I thought was an ancillary effort probably to the main one. It might have a target of opportunity. But that was not the main effort.

Mr. Baron. Off the record for a second.

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Baron. So your written recommendation would have been made approximately in the summer of 1960?
Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Before we move away from Cuban operations, let me show you one cable that we have which is from
and it appears to be to CIA headquarters because it is marked IN 75100, and it is dated September 16, 1964 in handwriting
that was put on the copy that we have by the Agency.

This is not the original copy of the cable but it appears to be a copy that was deleted and paraphrased for the purposes of providing it to the Committee in the early days of our inquiry.

We will mark this as Exhibit 7.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 7)
Mr. Baron. You have had a chance to read this cable now?

Mr. Hunt. I have.

Mr. Baron. I told you while we were off the record and I will reiterate now that Agent 1 appears to be a paraphrase or a substitution for AMLASH/1.

Were you aware of the operations of AMLASH/1?

Mr. Hunt. No, I was not and I don't know his true name.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of a major in the Cuban army who was fairly close to Fidel Castro and who was a leader among the students at the Havana University who was cultivated by the CIA as a contact?

Mr. Hunt. No. I may have been contemporaneously, but so many people were cultivated by the Agency in those days. Everybody was doing it, but I had no specific knowledge.

Mr. Baron. Does it refresh your recollection if I tell you that AMLASH/1 was Rolando Cubela? C-u-b-e-l-a.

Mr. Hunt. I know that there was such a person, but I never had any contact with him and I know nothing about him.

Mr. Baron. Do you know anything about the incident that is described in this cable?

Mr. Hunt. None at all. I'm sure that the reference in paragraph five is not to me.

Mr. Baron. The sentence that says, "Quite likely, Eduardo will never appear to contact subject."
Mr. Hunt. That can't conceivably have been a reference to me.
Mr. Baron. Why is that?
Mr. Hunt. Because I had not been involved in Cuban activities for more than three years at that time. I was purposely isolated from all Cuban activities after the Bay of Pigs.
Mr. Baron. You said you did operate out of Madrid for a period of time but it was later than September of '64?
Mr. Hunt. No. Let me clarify that.
I was sent to Madrid in either '64 or '65. I can't recall which, and I stayed there less than a year. My communications were handled independently between myself and Tom Karramesines, who was then Deputy Director for Plans.
This was a project that had been laid on by Dick Helms.
and I had no Cuban activities of any kind.
Mr. Baron. And did you have any knowledge of a relationship to a plan to assassinate Castro, supposedly to take place during a university ceremony?
Mr. Hunt. No.
Mr. Baron. Let's move on now to an entirely different area, and I will ask you to begin by describing your general role in the middle of the 1960s on the CA staff with regard to
press publications or press placements or any responsibilities
you may have had for media relations.

Mr. Hunt. After Allen Dulles's resignation and retirement,
I was assigned for about a period of a week to the CA staff
and I then transferred to the newly set up Domestic Operations
Division under Tracy Barnes, which was really the Commercial
Operations Division, although it was never so-called.

I was the first Chief of Covert Action for the Domestic
Operations Division and we inherited as a new division a number
of projects that had been running for a period of time, that
had been run by the commercial staff of the Agency and by a
number of the geographic divisions.

The purpose of turning these ongoing projects over to the
Domestic Operations Division was to centralize contacts with
publishers in the United States for the benefit of geographic
divisions such as the Asian or Far East Division which might
want a book published or for a particular purpose.
They would come to Tracy Barnes with a particular request.

And I should say that the relationship with the
Publishing Company had been in existence for quite
a period of time and I think they were managed by Cord Myer
International Division, if I'm not mistaken, or possibly the
CA staff. But what we received were ongoing operations. We
were sent the case files for the project, for the...
organization, which had been operating out of the National Press Building in Washington. We had a project in which I visited on one occasion called, which we ran out of a Virginia office.

I had no personal media contacts with American magazines or newspapers, if that is the thrust of your question.

Mr. Baron. Actually, I'm interested in this whole area, both contacts with specific reporters or media people domestically or contacts with publishing houses or contacts abroad in the publishing field.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I've given you the names of the publishing houses that we had contact with. I did on one occasion meet and I can't recall the purpose of it, it was a very large textbook publishing house and their main offices were in New Jersey. If I had an annual for publishers, I could pull it out.

But beside from that publishing house, we never did any business with them. I don't recall of any publishing houses beyond, that is trade publishers, that we dealt with.

We had our own press agency, which I imagine you're quite familiar with.

Mr. Hunt. Can you describe the standard mode of operating with these various publishing outlets?

In other words, how would you have supplied them with
material? Would you urge them to publish a manuscript they
already had from another source? Would you give them a
manuscript that CIA personnel had written under a pseudonym?

Mr. Hunt. I don't think that ever took place, to my
knowledge.

What I recall is [redacted] meeting with Tracy Barnes
and me or individually, either in Washington or New York during
this period and saying I have a great book I would love to
publish, but it's not economically feasible, and I think it
would be good for you people abroad for the following reasons.
And we might come up with the differential or we might not.

I don't recall any Agency-created manuscripts that were
sent to [redacted] or for that matter, any other publisher.

I recall we had a lot of accounting problems with
and finally we got really almost bogged down in arguments
about back copies. It was a little on the nightmarish side.
We did turn out some good books, but I couldn't give you a
title at this point. But I'm sure that they are a matter of
record within the Agency.

Mr. Baron. What was the nightmarish aspect of it?

Mr. Hunt. Well, apparently, before the project came under
DOD, it had been handled on a very freewheeling basis by the
previous project managers. [redacted] not everything he wanted
from the Agency in terms of subsidy money and expense money —
and publicity money and that sort of thing and when we took
it over it was brought under -- I hesitate to use the term professional management, but I do so in a qualified sense in that I was the only one, I guess, who knew anything about the publishing industry, who had ever been connected with the project. So I knew a little about it.

And at that time, with the help of our own commercial people within the Division, our accountants and auditors and so forth determined that there were a number of aspects of our fiduciary relationship with the company that would bear greater investigation.

So the relationship from a freewheeling one prior to our DOD managerial take-over, it became from a freewheeling thing, it became sort of an unpleasant continuous argument about dollars and cents, rather than functional matters.

Mr. Baron. Out of what funds at the CIA did these monies come from that we were giving to Mr. Hunt. I wouldn't have any idea, project money.

Mr. Baron. Who signed off on the project money?

Mr. Hunt. Well, it would depend on how much it cost. I think that Karamessines could sign off up to $50,000 and beyond that it had to be signed off on by Halms, I think. That my best recollection. And I don't know -- as annual review was conducted, and of course the division chief had to approve it.

Mr. Baron. Did the operation involve companies other than
the ones you've mentioned? In other words, supplying funds to companies other than the ones you've already mentioned?

Mr. Hunt. I don't know of any. None that I knew of.

I would be very surprised if a memorandum showed up saying that we were dealing with Random House, for example. I just don't recall now.

Mr. Baron. Was there any other aspect to your liaison with these publishing houses other than their seeking funds to publish books that you were interested in having published?

Mr. Hunt. Only this, that the USIA was, I think, finally brought into a formal relationship with DOD, at least my part of it, and the head of the book division at USIA and I would meet from time to time and he would indicate that he had a good one that we really ought to do rather than USIA and vice versa. And he knew fully of the relationship.

Mr. Baron. Can you describe the process that you would go through to ensure the publication of a book that the CIA was interested in having published? An example that I was given by somebody on our staff who has been looking into this was books written by or ghosted for Chinese...

Mr. Hunt. As I recall it, the Chinese branch sort of ran a parallel operation. I don't recall their coming through us. I don't recall a book when I was in that particular job. What I do recall is, I remember the Near East Branch bringing to our attention a book that they...
would like to have publish, and it had to do with the
border dispute, the name of which I can't
recall. So the manuscript would have been read by
or his principal assistant, and he would give an indication
of what he thought the marketability was. And at that point --
well, in this instance, we got the funds from the Near East
Division. When it came down to that, why should DOD, who had
no interest in the dispute, provide money for
that particular piece of propaganda. So the money would be
transferred somehow from the Near East Division's allocation.
It would be their project, but we would be the managers of it
when it got down to the point of dealing face to face with
the matter. My office would keep the division
apprised of the project, when publication could be expected, and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Were there any other CIA publishing proprietari
than the two you have mentioned.

Mr. Hunt. That I had personal knowledge of within the
Domestic Operations Division, no.

Mr. Baron. You qualified that by saying within the
Domestic Operations Division. Were there others?

Mr. Hunt. Because the international operations or Inter-
national Organizational Division under Cord Myer, ran quite a few
things in conjunction with the Congress for Cultural Freedom,
for example. Radio Free Europe, those things that went on.
Mr. Baron. Did CIA do ghostwriting for non-CIA publications?

Mr. Hunt. I ghosted a couple of -- I'm very reluctant to go into this, although I have discussed it with John Crowson. But this is another one of those difficult areas where it's very hard for me to prove.

There came a time in the spring of, I think it was the spring of about 1969, when the Soviet Russia Division asked me if I could cause to have published something on the -- by this time I was no longer with the Domestic Operations Division. I was with Western Europe -- on the increasing use by the [redacted] and things like that, and Christ, I hope this doesn't get out.

And so I went to Helms. Howard Osborne was then Chief of the Division, as I recall. He was late Director of Security, and this had been staffed out. And I prepared the article and it appeared in large portions unchanged under the byline of [redacted] And it was not a fabricated article. It was just information which was supplied which he wrote somewhat in his own style, and there was a second article which appeared a month or two months later, and this was done by Dick Helms.

Mr. Baron. Also under [redacted] byline?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. You could understand the difficulties involved here and I don't need any more enemies. I have plenty.
Now that is my own personal contribution to that sort of thing. But I can't think of anything else that was done.

Mr. Baron. By other people? Was it a general practice to supply either prefabricated articles or the material for articles to favorable press contacts in this country?

Mr. Hunt. Well, we know about the book, which was largely a cooperative venture with the Agency, and that was done by the SR Division.

You are aware of that, aren't you?

Now in that case, you see, the SR reached out on its own. Penkoski Papers was another example. We had nothing to do with that in DOD. That was done, again, by SR division. And I can understand why.

But basically, in answer to your question, I have given you everything that I have personal knowledge of.

Mr. Baron. When you made the arrangement with... Mr. Hunt. I made no arrangement with him.

Mr. Baron. Who handled liaison with him?

Mr. Hunt. Dick Helms.

Mr. Baron. And was that a one-on-one arrangement or were there other people knowledgeable?

Mr. Hunt. I believe it was a one-on-one, old school tie arrangement.

Mr. Baron. Was there any list kept at the CIA of favorable
media contacts who could be counted on to disseminate a story 
that the CIA was interested in disseminating?

Mr. Hunt. I would have to say yes, but I wouldn't know 
where it was kept other than either Karramessines's office 
or Dick Helms had it.

Mr. Baron. Were such media contacts utilized to disseminate 
derogatory information about the targets of some CIA 
operation?

Mr. Hunt. I can't recall any such incidents.

Mr. Baron. Were they used to disseminate information that 
might have some impact on diplomacy?

In other words, say --

Mr. Hunt. American diplomacy?

Mr. Baron. Yes, in preparation for a meeting between 
American leaders and leaders from another country, the CIA 
might hypothetically want to disseminate a certain kind of 
information.

Do you know if that kind of thing was done?

Mr. Hunt. I suspect that it was. It certainly was within 
the general thrust of what we were trying to accomplish.

But let me go back to something that I think is pretty 
fundamental that we have not gotten into yet.

Neither USIA nor CIA had a charter that allowed it to 
propagandize the American public. And this is one of the 
difficulties that I had when I took over the managership of the
I felt that a strict construction of the CIA charter made the project quite suspect because if we were doing a book, for example, on Communism, who was the target? It would have been highly inappropriate for United States citizens to be the target of the particular book, and we did a hell of a good book on Communism. It became about this thick. I can't recall the title.
If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They
don't all necessarily read English, and we had a
So unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is
published in India, for example, where English is a lingua franca.
then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this
was rationalized by the project review board that looked over
the operation, and the and things like that was that the ultimate target was
formed, which was true, but how much of the output
actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.
Now, in the case of the material was
physically mailed from Washington to foreign targets, the
newspapers, I think particularly the Agency was a client. The mere fact that the project was
rooted in the United States gave it sort of a credibility
lustre abroad in that particular era. If it came out of
Washington then it was probably okay.
But I had no domestic U.S. papers
as clients. What I'm trying to get at is that DOD handled
operations which were based domestically in the United States,
the commercial operations, and this includes proprietary
airlines and things like that, whose ultimate target was
abroad. The principal target or even a tangential target was
not the United States citizen.
Mr. Baron. But, with anything that was published in English, the United States citizenry would become a likely audience for the publication?

Mr. Hunt. A likely audience, definitely.

Mr. Baron. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept out of or away from the American reading public?

Mr. Hunt. It was impossible because I was a commercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read. Again, I say it was a matter of great difficulty. Mr. Barnes resolved all that philosophically, and I simply carried out the dicta.

Mr. Baron. What was your philosophical opinion of the danger of propagandizing Americans?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I knew that it was not a part of the Agency charter, and it was a matter that the USIA looked at. I talked about it occasionally. The USIA coincidentally had come under some criticism at that time for subsidizing certain publishers in the United States. That became known; I don't recall how. I discussed with the USIA book man and with Barnes the danger that we might be criticized for the same reasons. I was never enchanted with the operation. I thought it cost far too much money and had minimal benefits abroad, and further, we had the liability, the vulnerability to quite reasonable criticism that we had U.S. citizens as a
target, or an audience, I should say.

Mr. Baron. Were there any precautions taken against dissemination in America of publications by CIA proprietaries in English?

Mr. Hunt. Proprietaries, well, my only personal knowledge is the operation which I say was simply mailed out of Washington. That was the only precaution, rather than our people mailing them themselves.

Mr. Baron. Were any techniques used to prevent contamination of American intelligence by picking up on things that the CIA was actually publishing or arranging to have published?

Mr. Hunt. I would assume so, and I would guess that that would be done in the first instance by the knowledgeability of the reports officers in the various geographic divisions at headquarters who would scan newspapers, for example, or they would receive raw reports from let's say, and see that there had been a big sale of a particular book which we had sponsored, which they knew we had sponsored but nobody else knew. Of course, would have known about it, too.

So I would say that it was a pretty good fail-safe. The area of knowledgeability was high. For one thing, I traveled some in those days. I traveled to Bombay. I talked to the there. I traveled to New Delhi and talked to there, who was my CA opposite number, and
keep them up to date as to what we were planning. I would do
the same in France and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Were there any specific instances that you know
of of an eventual placement in the U.S. press of a story that
the CIA generated or fabricated abroad somewhere? For instance,
a story could conceivably be picked up by the UPI or by Reuters
that the CIA had planted abroad.

Mr. Hunt. I can't recall anything significant. I would
guess that during the Cuban, during the days of maximum
Cuban operation that sort of thing happened. I would think it
would be unavoidable, but I can't specify.

Mr. Baron. And are there any other instances than things
you have mentioned of direct placements of stories in the U.S.
press by the CIA?

Mr. Hunt. I have mentioned the [REDACTED], which was a
cooperative venture with [REDACTED] on the two
things. No, I can't recall.

Mr. Baron. I touched earlier upon the possibility of
disseminating derogatory information about Agency targets. These
were you aware of any general program of that nature to discredit
either a foreign political leader or a foreign political fac-
tion, or domestic political groups or leaders?

Mr. Hunt. To the latter question, no. Domestic, I am
not aware of any.

I think the Soviet Russia division was quite active, and it
1 kept a list, for example, and maintained a very good list of
2 KGB officers abroad, and when one would show up at Luanda, for
3 example, they would make sure that the local press got the
4 man's dossier, or at least a blind handout so that they would
5 know who the fellow was, much as the Butz counterspy operation
6 is doing today against the CIA.

7 Mr. Baron. Did you make arrangements, or did you know
8 of arrangements being made for non-CIA authors to write pieces
9 that were favorable to the CIA?
10 Mr. Hunt. No.
11 Mr. Baron. There was no funding of that kind of opera-
12 tion?

13 Mr. Hunt. You mean sort of flackery, the favorable
14 publicity for the Agency, is that what you imply?

15 Mr. Baron. Right.
16 Mr. Hunt. No.
17 Mr. Baron. What about subsidizing non-CIA authors to
18 write stories of any sort, or books of any sort that the CIA
19 was interested in having published?

20 Mr. Hunt. I would say this in a qualified sense. Where
21 in the past we had given a commitment to buy X copies
22 of his book on the problem, obviously
23 we were subsidizing the author of that book because it was
24 our money that was ultimately passing to the indi-
25 vidual, but that was doing it rather than us. In


other words, there was never any face to face contact.

Mr. Baron. Aside from dealing through publishing houses that you had established contact with, did you deal individually with authors who were non-CIA employees?

Mr. Hunt. I did not. I don’t think DOD did. I think that Far East Division did.

Mr. Baron. Do you know with whom?

Mr. Hunt. You mentioned Chinese for example.

Well, they dealt also, the Soviet Russia division dealt with on the Penkoski case. In fact, I had lunch with while he was doing the Penkoski Papers. So that was an example.

Mr. Baron. Did they have a regular program?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I think so.

Mr. Baron. Both of those two divisions?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that you think we would need in order to have a fairly clear, complete picture of the relations to the media or the publishing industry?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I think you could get probably a good deal more information from Cord Myer, who had a lot of that directly under him when he was Chief of the International Organizations Division, and of course, he served as Deputy Chief of Clandestine Services for quite a while. He would probably have as panoramic knowledge as anybody. I guess he's
1 still in London.

2 Mr. Baron. Let me move you back to Allen Dulles's heyday
3 at the Agency and ask you -- and this is at a very general
4 level, for some sort of picture of first, your relationship
5 to Dulles and secondly, the way he operated and made decisions,
6 both formally and informally.

7 Mr. Hunt. Well, my direct exposure to Allen Dulles began
8 in the wake of the Bay of Pigs when I was transferred to his
9 office until I guess just before his retirement, by Dick Bissell.
10 They needed somebody in Dulles' office to -- I believe I've
11 covered this in my autobiography, as a matter of fact -- to
12 answer the many questions that were coming in to the Agency
13 from let's say the "Green Committee," that was investigating
14 the Bay of Pigs failure, and the press, the New York Times;
15 a lot of questions were being posed to Allen Dulles and to the
16 Agency about the Bay of Pigs, and I had about as good a view
17 of certainly the political background of the effort as
18 anybody because I directed it for a period of time until just
19 before, when I resigned that post.

20 Mr. Dulles at that time was very harrassed. Bobby Kennedy
21 was harrassing him almost daily at these meetings. The story
22 had been put out, of course, that this was a CIA failure.
23 None of us associated with the project, least of all Mr.
24 Dulles, believed that for a minute. We looked upon it as a
25 failure of nerve by the New Frontier since what had happened
was that we had made the -- the President had given certain
undertakings to Cuban leadership and to our own paramilitary
people, and had failed to carry them out.

However, this fact was successfully disguised for a number
of years, but Dulles and Dick Bissell paid the price.

In any events, the Bay of Pigs cost Dulles his leadership
of the Agency, and I had the utmost respect for him. I was
associated with him as an assistant for the special Cuban
Bay of Pigs purposes, for a period of several months prior to,
perhaps six months prior to his eventual retirement.

I had had occasional contacts with him as a

and I had seen him in Japan when he came over there
and we had some discussions. Mr. Dulles brought into the
formal Central Intelligence Agency the same feeling of esprit
de corps that we had all enjoyed in the Office of Strategic
Services, and this was largely lost during the McConne director-
ship. And I think we had some admiral after that, Admiral
Radford, possibly. We got under a group of managers, and the
human element that we had enjoyed in OSS was gone with the
passage of Allen Dulles until Dick Helms came back in. You
see, I'm an unrepentent admirer of Allen Dulles and the way we
used to do business. Why do I say that? Because the way we did
business during Mr. Dulles's directorate was precisely the way
we did it in OSS during General Donovan's creation and direction
of that organization. In OSS, which was Allen Dulles's training
ground as much
as mine, you had the feeling that no idea would ever be stifled simply for lack of a hearing. General Donovan was open to all sorts of suggestions just as Allen Dulles was later, and this was a great feeling for creative minds within the Agency, during a large part of my career, that if you had a good idea, it would be reviewed, considered and accepted or rejected on its merits.

Mr. Baron. Let me break in here because the hour is getting late now and I don't want to stretch this out too long. But I would like to get to any specific information you might have or impressions you might have had of the way Allen Dulles would deal with Presidents or the National Security Council.

Mr. Hunt. I have no knowledge of that area at all. Of course, when President Eisenhower was in office, Mr. Dulles' brother was Secretary of State, and it was at that same time that we began the successful Guatemala operation. We certainly had President Eisenhower's hearty endorsement, and I can only assume from the fact that we never had any difficulties or criticisms that Mr. Dulles had the best possible rapport with at least that particular President.

Mr. Baron. Were you personally aware of the nature or the frequency of Allen Dulles' contacts with President Eisenhower

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the style with which he made decisions along with a President on a major covert
operation, namely, were these decisions always made in a formal
fashion before the NSC, or some subunit of the NSC, or were
they made informally?

Mr. Hunt. I have no information on that.

Mr. Baron. Why don't we stop here for today.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the
above-entitled matter was concluded.)
STATEMENT BY E. HOWARD HUNT

A year ago when Congress established the Church Committee, Senator
Baker was quoted as saying that I would be an early witness. I was then free
on Appeal and readily available to testify concerning CIA involvement in
allegedly illegal activities. Moreover, I viewed testifying before the
opportunity
Committee as a further/to testify under oath concerning my total non-
involveent with Messrs Oswald, Bremer and Sirhan, persons with whom my
name has been slanderosely and libelously linked in press and electronic
media. Although I had been interviewed previously by the FBI and the Rock-
efeller Commission with regard to these allegations a host of assassination
biffs and media advocates continued irresponsibly to associate me with the
deaths of the Kennedy brothers and the crippling of Governor Wallace.

My Appeal denied, I re-entered prison in April, 1975. Three weeks
later US Marshals escorted me to Washington DC for what turned out to be a
three-hour interview with a new Watergate Assistant Special Prosecutor. For
a 9-day period I was lodged at the Leesburg, Va., jail, and finally returned
via Detroit and Tallahassee where I was imprisoned in the isolation area
before being driven on May 26 to Eglin Federal Prison Camp. On May 27,
Assistant Committee Counsel Michael Madigan telephoned me to say that the
Church Committee wanted to interview me “within the next two weeks”. I
apprised Mr. Madigan of Public Law 93-209, Title 18, Sec.106c (a) Para. 1
(amended) which authorizes minimum security prisoners such as myself to be
furloughed for up to 30 days for purposes of testifying. Counsel Madigan
agreed to my testifying on this furlough basis.

Over the summer, however, I heard nothing further from Mr. Madigan
or his Committee associates. Then in mid-September a Washington POST story
alleged that I had been assigned by a White House superior to assassinate
columnist Jack Anderson. Senator Church was thereupon quoted as saying
that his Committee would investigate the charges. I welcomed this apparent...
opportunity, for the allegations had gained wide credence while my own
delayed response appeared only incompletely in the press. Still, nothing
was heard from the Committee.

In December 1975 John Crewdson of the New York Times interviewed
me in prison. He asked if I knew anything about "CIA assassination capa-
bilities," and I related to him my encounter with Col. Boris T. Pash. Mr.
Crewdson then inquired whether the Church Committee had interviewed me.
I responded in terms of the foregoing, noting that I would have testified
about the Pash encounter had I been given the publicized opportunities.
My interview with Mr. Crewdson was published and shortly thereafter my
attorney was contacted by a representative of the Committee.

I consider it highly discriminatory that the Committee is
unwilling to have me testify in Washington as a furloughed witness.

Further, the Committee's refusal to postpone interviewing me in prison
until one of two counsel familiar with my career and affairs is available
places me in a difficult position with regard to representation by informed
legal counsel. And, as during the Ervin Committee hearings (whose cost in
legal fees to me approached $100,000) I must again pay legal fees occasioned
by the interest of the Senate in a matter of no discernible benefit to me,

Between last January and April I could freely have traveled to
Washington to testify at the pleasure of the Senate. From then on I could
have been furloughed for that purpose and testified accompanied by customary
counsel who are not now available to me. Nevertheless, in demonstration of
my willingness to cooperate fully with the Senate I agree to be interviewed
under oath today.

Howard Hunt
M. Howard Hunt

January 10, 1976
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43  17  20
p.9 - REDACTED

10 - J-K-L

p.22 - [REDACTED]

17 Dec. 88 = HARVEY

p.25 - L. 21 = The Special Group

30 - 13 = NAGGI

45 - L. 41 = J or K

9 - L. 8 = Tracy
3 23 Bar
4 26 gi
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