Happy Holidays from NuclearSecrecy.com!
Image from the U.S. Department of Energy Digital Photo Archive.
Happy Holidays from NuclearSecrecy.com!
Image from the U.S. Department of Energy Digital Photo Archive.
On my post for Day 1 of this week’s archival trip, I noted that the Lexis Nexis database of Executive hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) was empty after 1962. I wondered if that could possibly be accurate or not.
The answer, after fishing around for a week, is clearly no. There are a bunch of Executive sessions that are not in the Lexis Nexis database, especially from the 1960s and a few from the 1970s. Some of these have been only very recently declassified — in 2005, 2007, and 2010. There are probably others still classified. (You can’t FOIA Congressional records, but you can request a Mandatory Declassification Review, which accomplishes similar ends.)
So I’ve been diving into these. The ones I have looked at so far cover:
Brien McMahon “… according to the staff’s report to me,… the Air Forces are going to do a test called Windstorm up in Kamchatka or Kiska or something.”
Gen. McCormack: “Amchitka.”
McMahon: “Kamchatka?”
McCormack: “Amchitka. Kamchatka is over the border in Russia.”
McMahon: “That wouldn’t be a bad idea.”
McCormack: “…to send American airplanes with American bombs to support foreign troops, I am afraid, would lead you into a most horrible sort of disaster because of the tie-in and coordination between air and ground forces is difficult enough at best if you all came out of the same school. It is very tough indeed when you come from different schools and if you pull a boner with an atomic bomb, as has been pulled with ordinary ammunition in Korea, if you pull one with an atomic bomb, I feel you will put back atomic support for ground troops by years.” [Fair enough — if you accidentally nuke your allies, they probably won’t want you playing with nukes again.]
Chairman Cole: “I understand even after they [the natives of Rongelap] are taken back you plan to have medical people in attendance.”
Dr. Bugher: “I think we will have to have a continuing study program for an indefinite time.”
Rep. James Van Zandt: “The natives ought to benefit — they got a couple of good baths.” [Seriously?]
Rep. Holifield: “Dr. Foster, did this general idea [MIRVing] originate in the laboratory or was it a matter of requirement by the DoD?”
Dr. Foster: “I am not exactly sure how it originated. It came up, I think, three years ago in connection with our concern over what capability might be achieved by the Soviet missiles.”
Rep. Holifield: “You didn’t go ahead with this without a formal requirement, I hope.”
Dr. Foster: “Yes, I am afraid we did. (Laughter) Let me be specific —”
Rep. Holifield: “You will be condemned by the Budget Bureau for that.”
All in all, it was a good week at the archives. (As I post this, they are literally kicking me out of the reading room. Something about going home to their families for the holidays?)
Next week I’ll post a bit more about my post-processing techniques for my files, since there has been some interest in that, and I hadn’t quite gotten them all written up in a sensible way.
Just a quick document for you today from the Legislative Archives: John Walker and Bill Borden, staff members on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, conspiring about creating a “second laboratory”: what would become the Livermore laboratory.1
It’s a short piece, from early 1952, but I find it pretty revealing about the “second laboratory” mindset at the time. It’s desperation is what appeals to me: Walker is fed up with the Atomic Energy Commission and the General Advisory Committee, and have basically concluded that the only way forward would be to give a bunch of cash to “an eminent scientist” who would round up patriotic colleagues and start their own lab, independent of the AEC or GAC. Walker believes that this “non-government and non-military establishment” impetus “would be important from a moral standpoint.”
Where the cash would come from, and who the scientist would be, is left unconsidered.
It’s kind of a mad scheme, given that the AEC had a total legal monopoly on this kind of research. It also show the lengths these particular Congressional staffers were willing to go — they were aiming to play a hugely active role in national policy.
I want to give a hat-tip to a former student of mine from Harvard, Eli Jacobs, who is interning at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has a number of great posts up on the CSIS blog, but my favorite so far is a discussion of a 1978 Defense Nuclear Agency report where they recommended nuking the Chinese-Soviet border in the case of war, with the hope that this would encourage China to invade the USSR. It’s an impressively bad idea for a lot of reasons, and you know how much I like collecting impressively bad ideas.
Studying the past is important. Don’t believe me? Well, check this guy out:
This guy sits outside the researcher entrance to the National Archives in DC, where I’m still camping out. Apparently he is just meant to be “the past,” and not any particular ancient historian. This is probably for the best, because let’s be honest — some of those guys were a little sketchy by modern standards.
Anyway, I’m still looking through the Legislative Archives. My little document-of-the-day relates to our good buddy, Edward Teller. If there’s one thing I’ve learned from looking at my blog statistics, it’s that the world is still pretty interested in Edward Teller. Gotta give the people what they want, eh? Well, why not — he’s always good for something unusual.
The New York Times ran a cover story today about a request by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to the journals Science and Nature to avoid printing certain details about new research on making a specific influenza virus strain more virulent (“Seeing Terror Risk, U.S. Asks Journals to Cut Flu Study Facts,” December 20, 2011). It’s an interesting case. Here are some quick, historically-tinted thoughts: