CURRENT ATTITUDES ON DISARMAMENT IN AMERICA

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ademician Topchiev and Fellow Members of the Sixth Pugwash Conference

I am moved and feel deeply honoured to have this opportunity to eak to you at this opening session. This comes on top of experiencing ain the warmth of a Moscow reception and finding here such a disting-shed group of Soviet scientists expressing in this way their concern th the most challenging problem of man's existence.

On behalf of my American colleagues, I am most anxious to express our Soviet hosts our thanks for their hospitality and for the care d attention that they have shown in the matter of the late arrival our papers. Beyond this we owe them a special debt of gratitude r their patience and for bearance in agreeing to postpone this nference from September after so much work had already gone into it. lo not think this has been in vain. Much has happened in the inter-ing 11 weeks that should help us to deal more realistically with the blems posed by the agenda. But the urgency remains and grows with h passing day. And those of us who, because of our special training knowledge and concern, are particularly sensitive to this urgency e the overwhelming obligation to try as never before to find new ways through, the jungle of obstacles that have beset the search for ing the arms race.

At this point in history, when the differences among nations have ome so uniquely dangerous as a result of their acquiring almost imited military force, it is necessary to state again and again a ple truth. All responsible nations share a common concern on which oo can be built. This is their commitment to self-preservation and development of their society and resources. This takes precedence r all other national aims.

More than that, all responsible nations accept a duty to humanity ywhere and especially to the poorer nations who evidently need our stance in their determined efforts to modernize their societies.

For centuries the traditional response to a threat to this core of onal life and purpose has been the resort for arms. Having found rustworthy atlernative the world is now spending over 100 billion ars per year in the hope of purchasing security. And the cost is to be measured in money alone, but in the talent that is consumed the opportunities that are lost.

It is obvious that this is not judged to be too high a price to for security. But, as we know, the tragic fact is that this is not bought. Instead, with each passing year of the arms race, each try has less security, not more. As a result we face the increasing lihood that not only will the security of nations be lost, as in past , but the nations themselves and the civilization they support may tinguished.

Faced with this dilemma, it is logical that man, having the power ought, will ask if there are not better alternatives.

Of course, in principle, this challenge could be perceived at the

time of Hiroshima and many people in this room recognized it at that time. But it is only within the last few years, with the development of multimigaton weapons and advanced delivery systems, that the dimensions of the problem have aroused thinking people in many countries. For some, this arousal has been followed by a lapse into apathy because some minds rebel at accepting the implications of the facts, or the spirit simply loses hope. For others the response has been to embrace unilateral disarmament, a policy that does not have a good record in preventing war. Still others have seen hope only in pursuing the arms race a bit further taking as their justification Churchill's famous dictum of another age, "We arm to parley". There is something in Churchill's view, but now is the time to parley.

If I sense correctly the spirit of this Conference, we do not believe these responses are adequate to the challenge. Instead we have come here to present and discuss views that are realistic alternatives to the arms race; alternatives that better serve the security of nations and the trust that our generation holds to those who come after us.

It is in this spirit that we think the current views of the Soviets, ourselves and the others on how disarmament can be achieved should be presented and questioned and discussed. It is not the need for disarmament that requires argument; it is the problem of how it can be done that needs study. Our job now in this meeting is not to pass resolutions stating the importance of disarmament. Our job is to get on with the task of finding realistic and more secure alternatives to the arms race. We must not misjudge the scope of this problem. For more than a generation the genius and labor treasure of the major powers have been concentrated in the most highly organized effort the world has ever known. This will not tumble and a peaceful world fitting each person's desire will not appear by saying it should. If this enormous agglemeration of carefully counterpoised power is not dismantled with a skill at least equal to that which created it, we may invite the very catastrophe we seek to avoid. I need not dwell longer on these matters which have been so adequately dealt with by the earlier speakers.

My distinguished colleague Academician Topchiev said in his opening remarks:

"... fear in international relations leads only to intensified arms drive, to the wish to overtake the potential enemy in armaments and military preparedness."

I strongly support these words. And I would add this; Fear is usually based not on what we know, but on what we do not know of others. Fear can only be driven from the relations among states by increasing openness among us - by a progressive reduction in the outmoded fog of secrecy which surrounds our national affairs.

It is against this background that I would like to make some rsonal observations on the discussions that have been going on in erica recently and find their expression in the papers of my colleagues. rhaps I should begin by saying that there has been a continually celerating interest among Americans in the search for nationally ceptable alternatives to the arms race. This is noticeable over the st two or three years both within government circles and outside. d it has found repeated expression in the political campaign just inished. President-elect Kennedy reaffirmed our goal in disarmament t that time and went on to say: "As I look at the future, I am convinced at we must lead the way in a world-wide effort to bring military apons under effective international control. We must mobilize first-te talents and ample research and development resources to put forward tailed proposals for arms control."

It was about three years ago, for reasons not entirely unrelated the successful exploits of some of our Soviet colleagues, that ientific opinion became influential in Washington. That of some ncered scientists began to fill the vacuum left after the collapse the Stassen efforts of 1955-57. Before long, studies of disarmament roblems were undertaken by several private groups and the results blished. Various government departments and related organizations ch as Rand began to give individuals full time assignments in the sarmament area. In 1959 a Panel, on which some of us served, was t up to advise the President's Scientific Advisor on problems in rms control and disarmament. More recently, the study of disarmament thin the Department of State has been reorganized and greatly expanded. veral well planned, unclassified conferences have been held. The roceedings of one of these was published this autumn in the Journal of he American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Daedalus.

Now, how can the nature and focus of these activities be simply scribed? As might be expected, these individual inquiries into such complex problem have yielded a variety of results. They are all scribed as studies in <u>arms control</u> or <u>disarmament</u>. In America these o terms are often used interchangeably but I think two differences n be detected. <u>Arms control</u> tends to imply a primary concern with ecific measures that will diminish the present danger and only after ocessive applications and adjustments will the area of substantial sarmament be reached. <u>Disarmament</u> studies imply a commitment to find ys of reaching a state of substantial disarmament on a definite hedule. Thus the long range aim can be the same but the emphasis is fferent. The second difference follows from current usage which gives arms control a broad generic meaning that includes universal disarmament.

The opinions held and the studies being made reflect this different phasis as well. At one end of the spectrum we find persons concerned imarily with immediate steps of a limited nature that clearly represent provements in world security and do not risk upsetting the present litary balance. At the <u>other end</u> are those who urge far reaching sarmament with little concern for the nature of the world that this uld produce. The quantity which varies as we move along this spectrum tthe individual's estimate of the increased security that a particular rms control arrangement can be expected to bring, balanced against the

sk of unpredictable consequences that it may produce in the existing wer structure. Thus at the left of this spectrum we find persons who quire certain gain at no risk as their criterion or acceptable arms ntrol measures. At the far right are those who judge the present tuation so precarious that no risk is too great in attempting to reduce e present threat.

Most of us, who do not occupy these extreme positions, share the pe that we can move forward toward a relatively disarmed world taking sks that are less than those we now are taking in the present arms race. differ in where the start should be made and how fast we should move. is helpful, I think, to distinguish three overlapping areas.

First, there are those who give highest priority to limited arms ntrol agreements that aim to diminish the danger of the present period. ese include, for example, the cessation of nuclear tests and other asures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, new means of reassurance diminish the threat of accidental war and certain limitations on the mber of missiles or nuclear weapons. In this group one finds those o think the world has already passed the point of no return with respect the elimination of nuclear arms. They argue that as a result the only pe lies in mutually agreed restrictions that make them less dangerous. hers in this group are more optimistic but, nevertheless, believe that e problems of balanced arms reduction are sufficiently complicated that perience with a set of such agreements is necessary before proceeding th disarmament schemes as such. They emphasize that every such agreeent on arms control can either increase or decrease the probability of r. As a result such agreements, like disarmament itself, can be either od or bad depending on the wisdom and purpose of the nations involved.

In a second class are those who see as our major need the stabiling of the present military environment so that arms control can proceed the turn-around-point, or turn-around period. This is the period at ich the automatic escalation of the arms race would stop; the time en new weapons systems would no longer be introduced. This would be e time when opposing nations would abandon military postures based on eir estimates of the other side's capabilities and instead accept the nounced intention of the other side to end the arms race. Now many nclude that this would be a period of great instability because in this tried area of international relations mistrust could easily develop d reverse the gains that had been made.

To provide a safe passage through this period much has been written d discussed in the West on the idea of maintaining during this period inimum nuclear forces as insurance against failure of the disarmament proceed to that point of time when the danger of nuclear attack is ut. This is a positive concept because it offers a way of proceeding th the enormous problem of disarmament without the need for detailed coern at every stage for maintaining the military balance. It should eatly hasten the implementation of any disarmament schedule. Moreover, offers a natural first step to ending the present nuclear stalemate ause it would bring about a very large reduction in nuclear armaments once while at the same time offering some insurance against the sibility that any signatory held a few weapons in reserve as a hedge inst disaster should the disarmament plan fail. This concept has eived the unfortunate label of stable deterrence. This is unfortunate ause it is not stable, it does not seek to restrain by fear and threat

s missiles are now used, and the translation of the word deterrence nto Russian and other languages is not easy. Moreover, the term has een applied to somewhat different concepts than that which I have ndicated. For example, it has been allied to describe the present uclear stalemate and the erroneous idea that it will remain indefinitely table. Therefore I ask that we do not become the victim of poorly onstructed labels, but instead look behind them for the ideas that hey represent.

We come finally to the third category, that of disarmament plans. e have before us the Western Proposal of March 15, 1960, the Soviet roposal of June 2, 1960 and the U.S. proposal of June 27,1960 as well s the new information provided to the General Assembly. There is much ere to work on and examine. And yet as one looks into this one cannot ail to see that massive problems are covered in single sentences. A umber of sentences, even phrases, refer to operations at least as omplex as that of creating and planning the United Nations Organization. his is no more than a primitive beginning on a vast undertaking. This s not to say that we must immerse ourselves in a sea of details and rown. Rather we must examine further the large issues involved. The ature of the legal system that will cover the many disputes that will aturally arise in such a process, the way in which the United Nations harter must be altered to cope with such an enormous task, the way in hich the consent of other Nations can be secured, what will take the lace of the threat of force in a disarmed world: all these and more eg for specific study and exploration before it can be known what it s that should be agreed upon.

More work has already been done in this direction than is apparent n public discussion and United Nations "debates". For example there s the carefully documented plan of Clark and Sohn which has now been ublished in its second edition. This is a detailed plan of universal nd complete disarmament which is described in detail by means of howing how each part of the United Nations Charter should be altered n order to accommodate the plan. It is not my purpose here to recommend his particular plan but rather to recomment its inspections and study or the ideas it contains and the impression that it makes of the agnitude of the problems of tribunals, verification and inspection, inancing and international police forces.

With these remarks I hope I have conveyed some sense of the ntention that disarmament problems are now receiving in America. It s by no means enough. For example, during our political campaign, enator Kennedy strongly criticized the Administration for having less han one hundred persons working full time on disarmament plans. But start ahs been made and I believe it will become a major preoccupation f the new Administration. What I have described may give some indica- ion of the course of future work. As can be seen, these modest efforts epresent the typical Western way of attacking complex problems. Many ifferent views are expressed as to how the job should be done. From ich public writing and discussion opinion gradually forms and with roper leadership the President can bring this together to form a ational policy. This process is now under way. You see that we spend ittle time on reconfirming our ultimate goals: the support of the nited Nations General Assembly Resolution on general and complete

isarmament settles that matter. Nor do we spend much time on arguing he virtues of disarmament: they have been well stated many times and ow most eloquently by Academician Topchiev, and are self evident for all ho have eyes with which to see. Our concern is with how these goals can e reached. It is in the formulation of this problem that the nature f a disarmed world will be defined. We must in this company not be atisfied with such oversimplifications as "Do you want disarmament?" his is like the parallel question, "Do you want peace?" The answer is aturally yes if one allows disarmament and peace to represent his own ision of the most desirable state for himself and his fellow man. But hese words can mean different things to different men. Peace can mean he unbroken tranquility of a prison cell and a disarmed world can be one hich warring groups roam over the face of the world. I make these unleasant allusions to emphasize that it is not enough to be for disarmaent or for peace. These words have the meaning we assume they have only nsofar as they are given definition by the means we wish to emply to chieve them. It is to this end that I hope we can make joint progress his week.

I would not be candid if I did not admit that we regret what we ave not seen in the Soviet publications any evidence of studies and iscussions of the type we have been undertaking. While we applaude he full support to disarmament goals given by the Soviet government e are anxious about their lack of extensive concern with how it will e accomplished. Likewise they in turn may lose patience with our oncentration on "means"rather than "ends". But it is to reach mutual nderstanding on these matters that we are here. Let us set about our ork in this spirit. Let us not indulge in propaganda statements. Let s not repeat the arguments that have been made again and again in eneva. Let us look to the future, not the past, with a new sense of rgency.