

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

Doris T. Pash

9

E X H I B I T S

Pash Exhibit No. 1

35

Pash Exhibit No. 2

43

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

**EXECUTIVE SESSION**

- - -

Wednesday, January 7, 1975

- - -

United States Senate  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with Respect to  
Intelligence Activities,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 o'clock  
a.m., in Room S-406, The Capitol, Senator Richard S. Schweiker  
presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Staff: Charles Kirbow and Frederick Baron, Professional  
Staff Members.

- - -

~~TOP SECRET~~

P R O C E E D I N G S

1 Mr. Kirbow. Colonel Pash, the way this thing really  
2 works before the Committee in response to your off the record  
3 request a moment ago, to be sure that your remarks are made  
4 known before the Full Committee is this. Historically this  
5 Committee, throughout its history this whole year, has proceeded  
6 in the manner in which we are doing now, normally a preliminary  
7 interview with any person whose name appears to be of interest  
8 to the Committee because of whatever reason. In this case,  
9 of course, your name surfaced with this article by E. Howard  
10 Hunt, apparently from his prison down in Florida. We have  
11 talked, as you know already, to Art Lazarus, whose name was  
12 also put forth by Hunt, and in any event, once you come before  
13 the Committee, even in an informal interview arrangement like  
14 you are now, this information is recorded, verbatim, all our  
15 remarks, all your remarks. It is then made available to the  
16 Subcommittee which is in being right now having to do with the  
17 CIA, or it is made available to the Chairman and the Vice  
18 Chairman and to the full Committee membership upon their  
19 return from this recess. They then determine as a Committee  
20 is this just no much conversation that Howard Hunt has put  
21 on the street that, you know, it is a hoax or it is not true,  
22 or we're not interested in looking any further into this,  
23 because from what we've heard from the witnesses thus far,  
24 there is apparently no truth to the big assassination type  
25

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 testimony taken by the Committee, you are in fact entitled, as  
2 you will see in our rules, to appear and/or to make such  
3 statement to the Committee in writing or otherwise as you care  
4 to make to state your position. That is not the case. We do  
5 not have a witness who has appeared and said Boris Pash is  
6 guilty of something or is accused of something. But I think  
7 that that basically explains the way we operate. This being  
8 more of an informal session, maybe after you and I and  
9 Frederick have made this record, maybe that's all that  
10 needs to be done.

11 We thus far only have the accusation and nothing more  
12 to substantiate it. I make that statement to you now. And  
13 Mr. Baron and I were in on the entire discussion, one or the  
14 other of us, when Mr. Lazarus was here, and I know him to be  
15 a longtime friend and associate of yours, and I'm sure the  
16 two of you have talked, and you may even know what he told  
17 us, and we don't care about that. We don't care if he talked  
18 to you and told you what he told us. We didn't proscribe  
19 that he shouldn't talk to anybody, nor will we caution you  
20 not to talk to anyone or him after you leave. You are entitled  
21 to do as you please in that regard.

22 Many of our witnesses who have appeared before the  
23 Committee go immediately out and there's a press conference  
24 held out at the end of the hallway here in these spaces, and  
25 they make their statements and the Chairman makes his, and

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 that's the end of it.

2 But we'll see how this goes along. But if you understand  
3 kind of those ground rules as to how the Committee operates,  
4 what we would like to do at the outset, at least, this morning  
5 is to limit our remarks between us basically as nearly as we  
6 can and still get the full story out as to anything you know  
7 about any of your duties in the intelligence business, wherever  
8 it may have been, that would have led Hunt to think honestly  
9 that you headed an assassination unit. If he had some reason  
10 to think that, and you can in any way in your mind say, well,  
11 I don't know exactly, but he may have thought that because  
12 of something that we were doing or the name of my group, which  
13 I was directing or deputy of or any part of, that's the sort  
14 of thing that we would like to limit at the outset, and then,  
15 since you have requested it, we would be happy to listen to  
16 any comments that you want to make about this Oppenheimer  
17 accuser business, although I will admit to you that that is  
18 not within the mandate of the Committee necessarily. It is  
19 so closely tied to this particular thing that I think here is  
20 a place you would put it on an official record which will be  
21 classified, by the way, Top Secret, when we take it here. This  
22 record is handled within the Committee -- and you should know  
23 this -- much like it would be handled if you had given a  
24 statement out at the Agency. It is compartmented, it is  
25 restricted in its security aspects under a system designed for

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 us by our security man in conjunction with both the Agency and  
2 the FBI.

3 So we have some things here which you and I in our days  
4 when we were engaged in any intelligence business, would never  
5 have thought that the Agency would ever deliver in wholesale  
6 quantities to a Congressional Committee, thousands of pages  
7 of stuff over there classified above Top Secret, you know, all  
8 of the code words and everything. We have never had, Mr. Pash,  
9 and this should be some little sense of security, we have  
10 never had a national security information leak from this  
11 Committee in a year. There have been conversations about  
12 certain things which we would rather had not gone into the  
13 press, some by our members and our staff, but nothing having  
14 to do with national security, normally a political type of  
15 remark, inadvertently or otherwise.

16 So with that, and knowing that everyone in this room is  
17 cleared through code word, the top clearance we have from the  
18 Agency, in other words, and that Mr. Baron and I are both  
19 cleared for this type of compartmented information -- in fact,  
20 he and I were in on the entire so-called assassination inquiry  
21 right up to the last day of it -- you should feel as free  
22 as you can to just informally tell us whatever you know that  
23 you think may have caused this fellow here to think that the  
24 Agency had a unit like that whose prime mission or any part  
25 of the mission was to knock off other foreign agents or

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 6 0 0 1 1 7 7 3

1 anything else like that. And I don't mean a wartime thing.  
 2 If it occurred during a wartime thing, maybe that's -- maybe that's  
 3 where he gets it, but with that, if you could maybe  
 4 just explain to us informally the situation, please feel free  
 5 to proceed in whatever manner you wish.  
 6  
 7  
 8  
 9  
 10  
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 15  
 16  
 17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25

~~TOP SECRET~~

## TESTIMONY OF COLONEL MORIS T. PASH

Mr. Pash. Well, I would like to make a comment with regard to one of the matters you brought out which to a degree appears to me will satisfy my personal interest, and that is if -- and I think I understand correctly -- if this matter comes before the Chairman or Vice Chairman or both --

Mr. Kirbow. It would clearly come to their attention, by the way, everything that has transpired.

Mr. Pash. When this thing is completed, the matters which I am hoping, or which I hope through appearing at the open session would get national publicity, if it would get say a prepared statement by me to the Committee, would receive national distribution without my having to impose on the entire Committee, that would satisfy my interests, you see, because there's no way that I personally can refute all of this to the American public, you see, other than through a release by the Committee, and that is the reason really that I came with the attitude that I would like to save my big guns for the Committee, so to say, in order that -- you see, because I had felt a certain degree of coolness, the same type of coolness which I found among my scientists who were assigned to my unit in World War II, after it became known in '54 that I appeared at the Oppenheimer hearing, some of them wouldn't speak to me. And now I can converse in a very short time with a reasonably limited contact with my friends, because I've been traveling.



~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET (S) 100-100000

7 6 7 0 7 1 2 1 7 3 1

TOP SECRET (S) 100-100000

1 I can already sense a certain degree of maybe I should say  
2 caution, you see.

3 Who in the heck do we know --

4 Mr. Kirbow. Well, Colonel, I think I fairly stated the  
5 Committee's interest in the matter, and we will proceed in  
6 accordance with the Committee's normal procedure.

7 Mr. Pash. At one time or another I would like to make  
8 a prepared statement. I would like to present a prepared  
9 statement which I would like to have in the record and through  
10 the Committee released.

11 Mr. Kirbow. All right.

12 I can say this for you. We would welcome a prepared  
13 statement from you which clearly would be a part of the record.  
14 It will be part of the same transcript, in fact.

15 Mr. Pash. I want it unclassified.

16 Mr. Kirbow. Your request right now will be treated as an  
17 addendum to this transcript, which her company will make up  
18 from this record this morning, and the decision again as to how  
19 the Committee treats a public release, of course, will rest  
20 with Senators Church and Tower at the outset, or with the  
21 Full Committee, if they choose to bring it before them. But  
22 normally, as I say, they try to put accusations which have  
23 received widespread publicity and upon which the Committee can  
24 find no evidence to substantiate, they try to put those to  
25 rest. Otherwise, we have done everybody in the country a

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 disservice by leaving it kind of up in the air. That's been  
2 their practice in the past, and I see no reason why they wouldn't  
3 follow that in the future. And your request, this specific  
4 request, will be made known to the Chairman and Vice Chairman  
5 when they return as we give them a condensed version of what  
6 the evidence shows.

7 All of the records of this Committee are available to each  
8 member in great detail, and surprisingly, out of the eleven  
9 people we have, most every one of them has read about 100  
10 percent more than I would have expected them to ever look at.  
11 They spend a great deal of time on the detail, because this  
12 kind of an investigation is made up of details.

13 Well, why don't you do this, then? With all of this  
14 on the record already, let me say that we want to welcome  
15 your coming here so voluntarily. Before we started we  
16 presented you with a copy of the rules. We cautioned you  
17 about your entitlement to counsel. You should also know that  
18 at any time during the period that you are giving this infor-  
19 mation to us here today, you may stop if you wish to do so  
20 and consult with Counsel of your own choice or one that we  
21 would furnish to you if you don't have a counsel, if you  
22 wanted to.

23 We don't foresee this sort of thing, nor are you an accused  
24 in any sense of the word before this Committee. You understand  
25 that. This is a general information type thing, and if we

100-368614-100

25 While in the Agency, for the first maybe a year -- and

~~TOP SECRET~~

again I'm not sure, but for about I think less of my -- less than half of my time in the Agency or maybe about half the time, I was in charge of a planning group, and this was a part of what I think when the Agency was formed in those days, they had Plans and Policy Division, and if I'm not mistaken, a man by the name of Frank, Mr. Frank was in charge of that.

Mr. Kirbow. This wasn't Frank Wiener?

Mr. Pash. Oh, no. Mine was Planning Branch No. 7, and that in general was individual type operations and all other such activities which the other six branches didn't specifically have. And I forget what the other branches were. One was Propaganda. That I remember. The other was -- well, I don't even --

Mr. Kirbow. Probably an intelligence collection outfit?

Mr. Pash. No. These were operational planning.

Mr. Baron. Political, economic?

Mr. Pash. Yes.

Now, of course, I think in order to understand the CIA, and it is something that I feel has not sufficiently been analyzed or reviewed, you have to know from where did the CIA spring.

Mr. Kirbow. This has been a disservice to you and the American people. All of this information, dating back to before the CIA was in being --

1 Mr. Pash. The OSS.

2 Mr. Kirbow. -- have been made available to us in great  
3 detail by the people who are in the business, and Lawrence  
4 Houston and all these people who have grown up with the Agency,  
5 but has not yet been made public in any report because we haven't  
6 written our final report yet. We are in the process.

7 Mr. Pash. Well, the reason I'm saying this is because I  
8 had experience during World War II with the OSS very unfavorably,  
9 not complimentary to the OSS. Again, one has to go back and  
10 see why did we have the OSS and why did it develop the way it  
11 did because all of a sudden we were without intelligence. I  
12 was called into the service -- I'm sorry I'm going back this  
13 way but in order to understand what I'm going to explain, I  
14 think you have to know my analysis of the situation, you see.  
15 If I'm not mistaken, I was the first intelligence officer  
16 reserve. I was a reserve officer. I had a reserve commission.  
17 I was teaching in Southern California and I had a reserve  
18 commission. I was called in in June of 1940, and I was the  
19 only counterintelligence officer called in and assigned to the  
20 1st 9th Corps Area on the Pacific Coast. We had no intelligence  
21 and we had to train while we had to operate, and that's  
22 because of our general attitude toward intelligence: we don't  
23 need it, it's not -- well, actually, if we will keep reverting  
24 to that same philosophy, I think somewhere along the line we  
25 can find maybe a great grandson of Paul Revere and give him

1 a lantern and have him sit up in a tower in Washington and tell  
2 us when the bombs are coming over, because that's in fact  
3 what we're reducing intelligence to.

4 So --

5 Mr. Kirby. We were woefully deficient during the war  
6 years.

7 Mr. Panh. Because we had to operate at the same time that  
8 we had to train ourselves.

9 Now, I was sent and attended the FBI school, the first  
10 FBI school for the officers of the military forces. The Navy  
11 and Army people went there. As a result, I just wanted to  
12 make this one statement, the OSS in a hurry had to expand into  
13 a thousand men, thousands of men with no experience, a lot of  
14 money, and just told that here's so much money, half a million,  
15 \$250,000, go and operate. And naturally that developed a type  
16 of person in addition to others -- there were some very good  
17 men in OSS, some dedicated men. Some men lost their lives in  
18 it. But also there were a lot of bums, you know, these  
19 entrepreneurs and adventurers and so forth.

20 So, when the CIA was formed, a lot of these people with  
21 these wild ideas and wild approaches were there. So of course  
22 when you say you're in charge of all other activities in  
23 individual activities, and these fellows might have ideas well,  
24 you know, like we did maybe in World War II, I heard they did  
25 or something like that, well, it's easier to kill a guy than

1 to worry about trailing him, you see. So maybe that is where  
2 something originated.

3 However, throughout my activity with Planning Branch 7,  
4 we have never had any request for or any plans that  
5 we may have initiated to assassinate, as far as I know, you  
6 see. And of course then after half the term, and they  
7 reorganized again and we went into I think sort of an area type  
8 activity and I was assigned to a broader type.

9 Now, just I think maybe a year ago on my last trip, maybe  
10 a year ago when I came back about a year ago, when this  
11 Committee, I think it was at the time when this talk of  
12 assassinations got started, Artie told me that there were  
13 some requests that came in while I was away. I was away on  
14 a tour, on a special mission from the office over in Japan for  
15 three or four months, but I never knew about it. He never told  
16 me about it, and then about a year ago when this assassination  
17 came up he said, well, somebody did request it, and I don't  
18 think he remembers who. At least, I don't even know who. And  
19 our office suggested a negative approach to it.

20 Mr. Kirbow. This is one of the workers that came up  
21 with a suggestion that we ought to knock somebody off?

22 Mr. Pash. You.

23 Now, just to give you an idea of the type of planning we  
24 did, if that is of interest to the Committee, I think that  
25 the idea of sending balloons with a certain amount of propaganda

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 in it, you see, and that is just propaganda giving our side  
2 of the story, was initiated in our office, and that came to me  
3 as a result of the fact that on the Pacific Coast we had these  
4 bombs that the Japanese were supposed to be sending with their  
5 balloons. So I can't claim originality there but just copying.

6 So once we copied the Japanese rather than the Japanese  
7 copying us.

8 Mr. Kirbow. We used that against Cuba later on.

9 Mr. Paul. The use of certain -- well, I won't say  
10 ethnic groups, but certain groups that could be used to the  
11 benefit of the United States. For instance, we suggested that  
12 the Cossack groups be brought into, be organized, be brought  
13 into the United States and settle in Alaska on the farms, but  
14 they are by nature a paramilitary group, and I know, I have  
15 studied them and I know them very well. I mean, not personally  
16 acquainted with them, but I know the Cossack history and who  
17 they are. Our people are misinformed a lot about them. They  
18 are frequently confused with the Mounted Gendarmes in Russia.  
19 They're getting credit for some of the things that the Mounted  
20 Gendarmes did. But the Cossacks are one of the most liberal  
21 type of groups in their own life and organization.

22 So our point was that we would have them settle in Alaska  
23 where they could work and so forth, but we would have an  
24 element up there --

25 Mr. Kirbow. That you could then use back outside the

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 country if you wanted to?

2 Mr. Pash. Well, not only that, but for the immediate  
3 defense of the country. This was in the period of cold war,  
4 you see.

5 I would like to say that many, many years later, just  
6 recently last year, I think, I read where our government, I  
7 suppose our government, settled a whole group of Russians up  
8 there, the Dukhobors, a religious group, which is the same  
9 principle we advocated then. We had a project to try to  
10 spirit Cardinal Menzenti out of Hungary. You see, those are  
11 the type of individual types of operations.

12 As a matter of fact, I think we also suggested that bottleneck  
13 with messages be sent down the Danube.

14 Mr. Kirbow. But this was an early clandestine type of  
15 planning group that would have planned an operation.

16 Mr. Pash. Yes, and I would like to point out that we  
17 were not operational. You see, when these people say an  
18 assassination unit, what disturbs my friends is that they don't  
19 know whether I wiped the blood off the knife I carry or not,  
20 you see. That is something.

21 (Discussion off the record.)

22 Mr. Pash. While I'm thinking of McElvanoy, he's a friend.  
23 I don't know whether his name needs to be brought in here  
24 at all.

25 Mr. Baron. Let me just interrupt to say that while we were

~~TOP SECRET~~

19

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

7 6 7 0 7 1 2 1 7

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

1 off the record, we discussed a certain friend of yours who had  
2 called into the Committee, and that's what you're about to  
3 discuss, just so it's clear for the record.

4 Mr. Pash. Yes.

5 Well, no, he called Mr. Kirbow without knowing he's a  
6 member of the Committee, you see. I don't think he knew he's  
7 a member of the Committee.

8 Mr. Haron. I believe he called in to Senator Tower's  
9 office.

10 Mr. Pash. Yes, he wanted to talk to Senator Tower, and  
11 Senator Tower directed him to Mr. Kirbow, and he talked to him  
12 because I didn't realize he was a member of the Committee. But  
13 anyway, he wanted to be sure that if any assistance was needed  
14 in my situation, you know, because I didn't know anyone here,  
15 really, and coming in cold, you might say. His mother sent  
16 him the copy of the newspaper from Dallas, and said, is this  
17 the Colonel Pash we know? And so he told me about it and he  
18 said, of course, I suppose that there are certain people who  
19 have to be taken care of like that. So in a cautious way,  
20 you see, if you've assassinated anybody, maybe we could find  
21 out whether it was necessary, you know, that approach, a  
22 cautious approach.

23 And I'm getting that, and that's what disturbs me, you  
24 see.

25 Well, anyway, to get back to these other operations of

~~TOP SECRET~~

Fig. 6.  $\alpha$ -D-glucose, 3 (1.0 g), 3 (1.0 g), 3 (1.0 g).

**TOP SECRET**

1 Mr. Baron. This was typical of the kind of thing that  
2 PB7 would do?

3 Mr. Pash. Well, one of the things we did, maybe one would  
4 say that the Political Branch would do it, but we felt that  
5 wherever we felt competent within our branch, and I think that  
6 I might say without -- well, with some feeling of overexaggeration  
7 that I was reasonably knowledgeable about the Soviet Union  
8 to a degree, more so than many people who surrounded me in that  
9 area.

10 Mr. Baron. So you would be looked to as an expert in  
11 Soviet matters.

12 Mr. Pash. Well, I felt that I could suggest it, even  
13 if they didn't ask me, because I felt that this would be a  
14 contribution.

15 So those are some of the things that we did.

16 Mr. Baron. That's very helpful to fill in some of the  
17 background on the functions of PB7, the general functions.

18 Let me ask you a particular question that was brought to  
19 our attention by Artie Lazarus when we spoke to him two days  
20 ago.

21 He said that when he first joined you in PB7, you asked  
22 him to read the charter of PB7, and the charter contained the  
23 very kind of language that you just described, such other  
24 functions as the six other branches are not performing, but  
25 he said it also contained some specific language about PB7

1 being responsible for assassinations, kidnappings and such other  
2 functions as may be assigned by higher authority.

3 Now, do you recall that part of the charter of PD77

4 Mr. Pash. I don't recall that particular wording. I do  
5 recall that whether it was an explanatory addition to the  
6 charter, or whether it was a part of the charter which was  
7 there when I came in, he discussed that with me before he  
8 came down here and I told him, I said, if you recall it, yes.  
9 I either just didn't give it a thought as I was trying to  
10 lead up to the explanation, or if I saw that, I probably  
11 just sort of glanced over it, thinking well, this is a typical  
12 OSS approach to things, you see, because most of those people  
13 there were old OSS people, and to them using words like that  
14 is maybe a common thing because they felt -- I think they  
15 felt big in talking that way in order to bolster their own  
16 interest. I certainly didn't give it any particular thought  
17 because I didn't remember it when Artie asked me about it,  
18 you see.

19 It could have been there without my recalling it, but I  
20 didn't give it any serious consideration because I know that  
21 that would be, probably, if I saw it, it would be beyond us,  
22 you see.

23 Mr. Baron. So now that we have brought it to your atten-  
24 tion, you are saying that you still don't have any independent  
25 recollection of assassinations being part of the charter of

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 PD7.

2 Mr. Pash. No, because I probably -- that didn't -- the  
3 effect it had on me more was toward the type of persons that  
4 would include that rather than to the activity which it included,  
5 you see.

6 Mr. Baron. So you're saying that assassinations could have  
7 been mentioned in the charter or in some addition or explanation  
8 of the charter, but as far as you were concerned, it was something  
9 that was on paper and was not an active function of PD7.

10 Mr. Pash. No, it wasn't. We never once within PD7, to  
11 my knowledge, discussed even the idea, should we develop  
12 something in that line. Neither assassination nor kidnapping.

13 Mr. Baron. To stay on that general level for a moment,  
14 in the rest of your associations with the CIA on detail from  
15 the Army, were you aware of any discussion of assassination  
16 plans or attempts or even the suggestion that an assassination  
17 be undertaken?

18 Mr. Pash. No. I never heard that. There was a small  
19 incident which again as a matter of fact, I made a comment.  
20 There was -- I forget the composition of the group, but there  
21 was a group, I think, of branch chiefs or something like that  
22 in Plans and Policy. Present was a woman who occupied a  
23 position like that, and there was a discussion with regard to  
24 denying to the Soviets certain types of individuals in order  
25 to deny to the Soviets in event of an advance by them through

1 Europe, industry. And of course the question came up, should  
2 we blow up the industry. Should we -- someone came up with the  
3 suggestion that if we denied them key, difficult to replace,  
4 highly technical persons whose skill had to be developed in  
5 years, that we should evacuate them to take them out, you see.  
6 This woman gets out and says, why don't we murder them? And  
7 I just turned to her and I said, I think, lady, you like to  
8 just hear yourself talk. And that's all I told her, you see.  
9 And in fact, that's what I sort of wrote it off to. Who she  
10 was I don't even remember. I don't know whether I knew her  
11 name then. She was in a group sitting around a table. But  
12 that is loose type of talk that could lead to some people,  
13 you know, saying well, they considered murdering people.

14 Well, she said that and everybody sort of looked at her,  
15 and I think they all agreed with me, she just liked to hear  
16 herself talk, you know. Here she was suggesting something  
17 like that.

18 Mr. Baron. But it would be your testimony that in terms  
19 of an operational plan or even a serious request for forming  
20 an operational plan for an assassination, you never heard  
21 such a plan with such a request?

22 Mr. Paul. No, and I have never been -- it has never  
23 been discussed with me in that position of mine privately  
24 by anyone, in other words informally saying have you considered  
25 that maybe we could kill somebody or something like that, or

1 I think it would be good to knock off so and so, and you fellows  
2 think you could plan it informally or something. No, never.

3 Mr. Baron. Just to follow up with this for a moment,  
4 you mentioned earlier that Artie Lazarus had said to you at  
5 some point recently that he did recall two suggestions of --

6 Mr. Pash. No.

7 Mr. Baron. Did he mention just one?

8 Mr. Pash. One.

9 Mr. Baron. Well, there was one while he was in PD7 and  
10 another incident that he was involved with when he was a station  
11 officer somewhere else and was not working with you at all.

12 Mr. Pash. I don't know.

13 Mr. Baron. The one that he mentioned in connection with  
14 PD7 was an incident, and I am simply now trying to refresh  
15 your recollection by summarizing for you what he told us the  
16 other day, he said, approximately in the summer of 1949, the  
17 chief of the political section, which he thought was probably  
18 P-1, but he wasn't sure, but he was sure it was the chief of  
19 the political section, came to him shortly after a meeting  
20 at the State Department, some sort of a regular planning  
21 meeting, and said we've just had a meeting in which it was  
22 decided that Chiang Kai Shek must be sent to meet his ancestors,  
23 and used just that kind of language, and it was clear that  
24 this was a request to PD7 to assassinate Chiang Kai Shek, and  
25 Artie Lazarus said that he was the Acting Chief at that point



1 because he believes you were in Japan, and he said that this  
2 same man who was the liaison with the State Department told him  
3 that there was higher authority for this request, and Artie  
4 Lazarus said he doesn't remember now whether he cited -- wait,  
5 I'm sorry, I may be misquoting myself.

6 Mr. Lazarus may remember now, and he may have decided that  
7 he didn't want to discuss the specific authority that was  
8 cited, but he was assured that there was some sort of higher  
9 authority for this request, and Artie Lazarus says that he then  
10 hand-carried the suggestion to Frank Winner's attention, and  
11 the response he got was from Tom Betts, who replied that this  
12 has gone right to the top and the answer is no, and you should  
13 convey this to the chief of the political section, or somebody  
14 should convey it directly to the State Department people, and  
15 Artie Lazarus can't remember exactly how the message was  
16 conveyed, but he's sure it was, and any records that surrounded  
17 it were destroyed, and that was the end of it as far as he was  
18 concerned.

19 Having refreshed your recollection with this story, do  
20 you now recall this incident?

21 Mr. Pugh. No. I never knew about that, and as I say,  
22 just a year ago Artie told me about it and he says, I never  
23 told you because you were away and it was washed up and nothing  
24 happened.

25 Mr. Baron. So you weren't aware of any action to follow

1 up this request.

2 Mr. Pash. No. We had no action as far as I'm concerned,  
3 and when I got back that was not brought to my attention, and  
4 as a matter of fact, until you told me, I didn't know it was  
5 Chiang Kai Shuk that they were after.

6 Mr. Baron. Did you ever see any documents about this  
7 request?

8 Mr. Pash. No.

9 Mr. Baron. Was it your understanding at the time that  
10 if such a request were made to you directly as Chief of PU7,  
11 that you would probably receive the same response from the people  
12 above you in the OPC?

13 Mr. Pash. Actually, of course, this is Monday morning  
14 quarterbacking in my mind. I hardly think that I would  
15 consider taking it up. You see, I was involved in background  
16 experience and everything with a lot of situations. I was  
17 over in Europe during World War I, and I don't -- I really  
18 don't take so lightly to this business of assassinating for  
19 convenience.

20 When I was stationed, and this is interesting with  
21 Hunt's comment about '54, when I was stationed in San Francisco,  
22 and I forget who it was who came to me in my office, somebody  
23 in Washington, I think, I assume it was, maybe the Criminal  
24 Investigative Division -- well, somebody, anyway, I think, from  
25 the Army in an investigative type of service, asked me what

1 I thought of assassinations. I think it was during the  
2 Korean war, maybe. No, the Korean war ended -- maybe it was  
3 after the Korean war, and there were some results that the head  
4 of the -- of that division was investigating, and I was a  
5 Chief of Security in San Francisco, and they might have been  
6 coming through, and in a conversation they asked me what I  
7 thought of the fact that -- what I thought of assassinations as  
8 part of covert activities then, and I said that the only time  
9 that I felt that any assassination would be justified was if  
10 somebody could categorically state that if it is not done and  
11 the person involved is an enemy, that the safety of the United  
12 States was at stake on that particular action. In other words,  
13 if you don't do it, the United States is destroyed.

14 And I think I might have brought out that the point is  
15 that if you're able to see a technician who has his finger on  
16 the atomic bomb and ready to put it off and you have no other  
17 way to stop him, but you can shoot him, I said, I think it's  
18 all right to shoot him then, but there are a number of, you  
19 might say, wild stories about me told as a result of my  
20 operations in Europe and everything, and I'm very aggressive  
21 and everything, but I can't see where there's any justification  
22 or that one could gain anything out of it. That's my  
23 philosophy, you see.

24 Of course, I must admit that if I were sitting in the  
25 chair when that request came, under the circumstances and what

1 the circumstances were I don't know, but my impression is that  
2 if I was sitting there then, I probably would not have let it  
3 get by my office. I think I would have told them to go direct,  
4 you see, because I would not want it to come through me up.

5 Mr. Baron. So you're saying that if someone had come to  
6 you with such a request, you would have said, you will have to  
7 ask people at the top yourself.

8 Mr. Pash. Yes.

9 That I think would be my position.

10 Mr. Baron. And at that time that would have meant Frank  
11 Wisner, the head of OPC?

12 Mr. Pash. I would have to get a yes from OP, and then I  
13 would probably -- because you can't, you can't really, you  
14 can't plan. You see, my branch was supposed to plan something;  
15 well, an assassination is an operation. So really we don't  
16 plan operations, a detailed operation. We plan, you might say,  
17 I don't know whether I'm making myself clear, but we plan an  
18 activity. Within that activity, like say --

19 Mr. Baron. Distribution of propaganda?

20 Mr. Pash. Or like resupplying the Cossacks or sending  
21 balloons over Europe, we would develop a plan for the activity,  
22 but the operational plan, the detail still was not the  
23 responsibility of my unit, you see.

24 Do I make myself clear on that?

25 Mr. Baron. You are distinguishing between a general plan and

1 function and specific operational planning, and you didn't do the  
2 letter.

3 Mr. Panh. No, we didn't.

4 Mr. Baron. Although you're saying that if assassination  
5 had been considered as something the CIA wanted to be able to  
6 carry out, a capability they wanted to develop, you might have  
7 been asked to develop some sort of general plans.

8 Mr. Panh. Yes, and if I were to plan it, it would be  
9 limited to such a thing -- well, without sort of jeopardizing  
10 my position on assassination, supposing I was supposed to --  
11 say I was told to plan an assassination and I agreed to plan  
12 it, my plan would consist of, we want to assassinate A, the  
13 conditions for this should be that it should be limited to  
14 those involved. Who was to be aware of it? How was it to  
15 take place, and so forth, the planning, and whom to send in,  
16 what to use, how to do it and all of that, that would not come  
17 under me.

18 Mr. Baron. That would be given to a case officer?

19 Mr. Panh. That would be given to the operational  
20 division. There was an operational division, you see, a  
21 man by the name of Lindsay was in charge.

22 Mr. Baron. Were you ever asked to develop a capability  
23 to carry out assassinations if it were necessary?

24 Mr. Panh. No.

25 The subject of assassination had never come up, either

1 informally suggested to me, to see what capabilities were  
2 needed, what equipment was needed, or a plan formally brought  
3 to me just to develop a theoretical plan, never.

4 Mr. Haron. Off the record for a moment.

5 (Discussion off the record.)

6 Mr. Haron. While we were off the record, we agreed  
7 that the next subject that we would turn to would be the  
8 specific article in the New York Times which accounts or  
9 recounts an interview by Howard Hunt with John Crowder of  
10 the New York Times, and Mr. Pash, you informed me while we  
11 were off the record that the prepared statement that we were  
12 asking about at the beginning of this session and that you  
13 wanted to introduce into the record is actually something that  
14 you have with you today and it relates to this matter  
15 specifically.

16 So this I think is the appropriate time for you to  
17 read that statement into the record, and then I will question  
18 you on it in detail when you are done.

19 Mr. Pash. Yes, fine. This is a statement to the Senate  
20 Select Committee on Intelligence. I appreciate your invi-  
21 tation to appear before this Committee. My appearance here is  
22 voluntary and is prompted by my conviction that the government  
23 agencies responsible for providing intelligence and security  
24 for our country are in need of a friend in court. Practically  
25 all officials of the agencies who have appeared before this

~~TOP SECRET~~

Committee, at least from what I have seen, heard or read, were on the defensive and apparently trying to excuse wrongdoings or alleged wrongdoings within their agencies, whereas it is the individual perpetrators of such doings who should be held accountable and answer for them. And on the basis of all the hearings, one cannot help but conclude that the position of this Committee is that those agencies, and even our highest executive branch officers were guilty until proven innocent. It is not beyond belief that many of the allegations of illegal activities by our intelligence and security agencies are based on speculation and innuendo, and not founded in fact.

As a definite example of this, may I draw the Committee's attention to a recent article which received nationwide publication. This article purports an interview with E. Howard Hunt, during which Mr. Hunt is alleged to have stated the following: "The Central Intelligence Agency had a unit in the mid-1950's to arrange for the assassination of suspected double agents. He was told by his CIA supervisors in 1954 or 1955 that Boris T. Pash, an Agency official, was in charge of the assassination unit. Hunt claims to have discussed the neutralization of an alleged Albanian penetration agent with Colonel Pash and assured that 'assassination was the obvious answer.'"

In addition to all of this -- and I would like to impress the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence -- in that your spokesman, who as mentioned in the article understands that I

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 am dead, is grossly misinformed, but may I return to the subject  
2 of Mr. Hunt and his insidious and completely false statements.

3 I did serve a normal tour of duty on military assignment  
4 to the Central Intelligence Agency, I assume because of my  
5 extensive experience in the field of intelligence and security.  
6 The period of this assignment was from early 1949 to the end  
7 of 1951. Mr. Hunt claims to have discussed the alleged  
8 assassination matter with me sometime in 1954 and 1955, at least  
9 two years after I left the Agency.

10 Upon leaving the CIA, I served in headquarters, U.S. Forces,  
11 Austria, from January 1952 to October 1953, at which time I  
12 was transferred to the Headquarters, Sixth Army, where I  
13 served from October 1953 to May 1956.

14 Mr. Chairman, I categorically deny having had any discussion  
15 on any subject whatsoever with Mr. Hunt during those years. As  
16 I said, I was assigned to CIA during 1949 to '51. My duties  
17 pertained to intelligence activities, and I wish to state  
18 most emphatically that I was never in charge of or involved in  
19 any assassination planning, nor ever requested to do so.

20 It is not inconceivable that I could have met Mr. Hunt  
21 while on assignment with the Agency on some routine matter. It  
22 I cannot recall every minor Agency official I may have spoken  
23 to.

24 Gentlemen, the mentioned article appears to be another  
25 in a series of unprincipled, irresponsible and willful efforts



~~TOP SECRET~~

3

1 to discredit the CIA. One could even construe that whenever  
2 there is a lull in Committee activity, some piece of new  
3 sensationalism just happens to come up. Unsubstantiated, un-  
4 verified, "sensational disclosures," of CIA activity are a  
5 blot on the escutcheon of the Fourth Estate. Although I have had  
6 certain and perhaps strong disagreements on certain matters with  
7 highly placed Agency officials in the past, I have always held  
8 the Agency and what it represents in high esteem.

9       We must remember that any Agency or any branch of our  
10 government is made up of people, by and large highly dedicated  
11 and hard working people. Therefore, no Agency should be  
12 condemned because of illegal or irresponsible activities,  
13 real or alleged, by a few ill-advised, incompetent or unscrupu-  
14 lous individuals who will seize any opportunity for selfish  
15 personal aggrandizement. We must not overlook the fact that  
16 such actions can be detrimental and injurious to the interest  
17 and welfare of the United States.

18       In conclusion, may I urge the Committee that in pursuing  
19 your responsibilities, you do not "neutralize" our intelligence  
20 and security assets, both at home and abroad, which are  
21 committed to protecting our nation and preserving her as a  
22 viable defender of democracy. Our nation and its leadership  
23 in these troubled times needs every bit of professional  
24 assistance it can get, and to deny this by discrediting  
25 the CIA and exposing its methods of operation, such as Agency

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 personnel who may be serving abroad, business firms with which  
2 Agency personnel may have been associated is nothing short of  
3 placing us at a great disadvantage in international relations.

4 I notice that in typing it I made a mistake which I will  
5 correct here -- the years when I was assigned to USFA, and I  
6 will make that correction.

7 Mr. Baron. After you correct your statement, may we  
8 copy that so that we can be sure that we have it accurately  
9 represented in the record?

10 Mr. Pash. Yes.

11 Mr. Baron. Thank you very much for that statement. It  
12 helps put your position on the record very clearly and articu-  
13 lately.

14 Let me follow up by first introducing as an exhibit this  
15 Howard Hunt interview which appeared in the New York Times on  
16 Friday, December 26, and which we will mark Exhibit 1 for  
17 this session.

18 (The document referred to was  
19 marked as Pash Exhibit No. 1  
20 for identification.)  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that the small unit discussed  
2 in the article is probably PB7, even though the time period is  
3 incorrect?

4 Mr. Pash. I assume that he is referring to the unit that  
5 I had at that time, yes.

6 Mr. Baron. And that would be PB7?

7 Mr. Pash. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. Did you have any conversation with anyone who  
9 was working with an organization in West Germany that the CIA  
10 sponsored or supported in some way in regard to a suspected  
11 double agent?

12 Mr. Pash. No.

13 Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of the Albanian Iron Guard  
14 or the Albanian Guardian Battalion, which are the two names  
15 that Howard Hunt has given to me as the possible names of  
16 this organization in West Germany that he was dealing with?

17 Mr. Pash. No.

18 If I may elaborate a little bit, we did make, we did  
19 prepare a plan for CIA support of an operation in Albania,  
20 but that did not involve individual action. It was to  
21 support a broad operation, and I do not recall those two names  
22 with regard to that particular activity.

23 Mr. Baron. Did anyone who was on the Balkans Desk or  
24 who was in liaison with organizations in West Germany ever  
25 come to you with double agent problems generally, for advice

TOP SECRET

Page 1 (Rev. 2-27-64)

76000001735

410 East Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 or for planning, whether or not they mentioned assassination?

2 Mr. Pash. As I recall, we never had anyone from the  
3 individual area groups come to us directly. In the days, as I  
4 recall it, and I think I mentioned earlier to you, there was  
5 the plans and policy group. The other was the -- well, it was  
6 the operational group, and that was, if I'm not mistaken, the  
7 group which Mr. Lindsay, Frank Lindsay I think his name was, was  
8 in charge of, and he had his regular top staff like Frank first,  
9 and then Wisner later had for plans and policy. So the ,  
10 contact was always between Lindsay's you might say headquarters  
11 with Wisner's or others' groups. So I don't recall ever talking  
12 direct, as a Chief of Plans Branch 7, on any plans pertaining  
13 to their operations.

14 I think I have known several fellows -- if I'm not  
15 mistaken, I think at that time a man by the name of Baker was  
16 in charge of Western Europe, in OPC, I think, or OPS.

17 Mr. Baron. Do you remember a man by the name of Douglas  
18 Blauefarb, who I think was on the Albanian Desk at that point?

19 Mr. Pash. No. I think I would remember that name, or at  
20 least I think I would recognize it, and I don't.

21 Mr. Baron. So you have no recollection of someone  
22 coming to you with a double agent problem relating to a  
23 West German operation.

24 Mr. Pash. I don't recall any discussion of any double  
25 agent type activity anywhere.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 Mr. Baron. PB7 was not a place that handled double agent  
2 problems?

3 Mr. Pash. No. Again you see, that was an operational  
4 thing.

5 Mr. Baron. Were you aware generally of how double agent  
6 problems would be handled when they arose? If an operations  
7 officer suspected that someone that he was dealing with was a  
8 double agent, what was the ordinary way of handling that kind  
9 of matter?

10 Mr. Pash. I don't know. I did not know. I assumed from  
11 my past experience that that would be handled within the  
12 operational division, and any operation to take care of a double  
13 agent in a low level operation within the division. So it would  
14 not come for any kind of planning on the level that our  
15 planning activities were sort of established, you see. You  
16 might say that was a detail rather than a broad activity.

17 Mr. Baron. And PB7 didn't deal with the details or even  
18 in a general way did not deal with double agent problems?

19 Mr. Pash. No.

20 Mr. Baron. So you're saying that even if Howard Hunt  
21 has the dates wrong, you don't recall any incident like the  
22 one he describes.

23 Mr. Pash. No.

24 Mr. Baron. Howard Hunt has relayed to me the information  
25 through his lawyer that he had a conversation with you, only

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page (Am 227) 544400

76000121733

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Page (Rev. 7-23) 544-0000

7600012173

also see Sheet, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

1 one, in addition to the one that's reported in the article. He  
2 has told his lawyers that he remembers only one other time  
3 when he ever talked to you, and it was in the hallways at the  
4 Agency, and he says that he stopped you in the hallway and  
5 asked you what ever came of this matter that he discusses in  
6 the interview. And he says your response was something to the  
7 effect that "this is heavy stuff. We have to be very selective  
8 about who we discuss this with." And according to Hunt's lawyers,  
9 that's all that he remembers you saying to him, and he dropped  
10 the matters and didn't inquire into it any further.

11 Did you have any such conversation with Howard Hunt?

12 Mr. Pash. I don't recall. I don't recall discussing it.  
13 Now, I might, as I indicated, sometime he might have seen me  
14 in the hallway or stopped me going into the snack bar or some-  
15 thing. I don't recall the man at all.

16 Mr. Baron. So you never dealt with Howard Hunt in any  
17 context that you recall.

18 Mr. Pash. No.

19 Mr. Baron. Would you recognize him on sight?

20 Mr. Pash. No.

21 Mr. Baron. Is this newspaper account correct, that you  
22 retired from the Army in November '67?

23 Mr. Pash. Yes, but I sort of, to a degree, resent the  
24 implication in the way this is written. It's written "left  
25 the service." It didn't say retired. Do you notice that, the

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 way it's put? Left the service with an undescribed -- it doesn'  
2 say undisclosed -- "undescribed permanent disability."

3 Now, it is absolutely inconceivable that a man would not  
4 be able to find out that I retired on disabilities resulting  
5 from injuries as a result of the instrumentality of war. That  
6 is the technical way, which amounts to about the same as combat  
7 disability, and I have a back injury and a heart attack, and  
8 exposure to radium. But this sort of implies -- and this is  
9 one of the reasons why I want to be sure that my counterstate-  
10 ments to this and other allegations are -- that they receive  
11 as wide publicity as these articles did, because this sort of  
12 implies that he was -- you might read into it, after you read  
13 the whole thing, that this man was eased out to get this type  
14 of fellow out of the way, so you sort of can get that impli-  
15 cation in there, you see, and I can't help but feel that this  
16 man Crowlson being a journalist, probably might have had that in  
17 mind in describing it that way. Otherwise, I don't see how he  
18 could have said retired because of permanent disabilities. But  
19 he had to bring it around in such a way that everybody would  
20 say, well, they edged this guy out.

21 Mr. Baron. Do you allow for the possibility that such a  
22 conversation with Howard Hunt did take place in the way he  
23 describes it, and that you might not recall it now?

24 Mr. Pash. I would like to jump. The reason is, to answer  
25 this, I want to answer your question by using this, you see.

~~TOP SECRET~~

41

1 Here he said in the first place that he was in contact with me  
2 in '54 and '55, which was wrong, and he said, Hunt recalled,  
3 he said, I talked to Boris. Nobody called me by my first name  
4 on first sight, you see, and he certainly is in no position at  
5 this time to refer to me under my first name.

6 Here he said, Pash, an Army Intelligence Officer at the time  
7 of his testimony said that he worked in CIA from 1949 to  
8 1952. Hunt said he was informed in '54 or '55 that Pash had  
9 previously headed the assassination unit. Prior to that,  
10 prior to '54, he didn't know I handled that unit, and yet he  
11 claims he talked to me about it when the incident took place,  
12 and yet in this article it is stated that he was only informed  
13 ex post facto, after I left the service and everything. Then  
14 he was told that I had that unit, you see. So he's contradic-  
15 ting himself right there.

16 Mr. Baron. We should make room for the possibility that  
17 the reporters had written it up in different ways and put a  
18 different light on what was said.

19 Unfortunately, we have not yet taken Howard Hunt's testi-  
20 mony, which we will shortly, and don't know whether this is  
21 a really accurate rendition of whatever he has to say about  
22 the matter. But if we look at --

23 Mr. Pash. But I deny that I have ever talked to him about  
24 it and that he ever asked me about it.

25 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that despite the fact that you

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

1 don't recall it, he may have raised the subject with you in  
2 the way he describes, and that you would have responded in this  
3 way, saying that you weren't sure that you could handle this  
4 kind of double agent problem and expressing some sort of shock  
5 that the subject had been brought up?

6 Mr. Pash. Well, in the first place I don't recall him  
7 coming to the office. If he came to my office for something,  
8 I probably would recall it. I do not recall anything. I never  
9 would discuss anything in the hallway, regardless of how secure  
10 a hallway, with anyone. I never did discuss -- I would never  
11 stop in a hallway and discuss a problem of this nature. So I  
12 think I can say that it is inconceivable that I have discussed  
13 this with Hunt at all.

14 Mr. Baron. Where do you think Hunt may have received  
15 the impression from his superiors or from what source did they  
16 receive the impression that there was an assassination unit  
17 which you headed?

18 Mr. Pash. I don't think anyone would have that idea. I  
19 think it is idea that I had a special type, in other words,  
20 special, a catch-all type, you might say, branch, and the only  
21 explanation I can give, as you know, as you might know, Hunt  
22 was a spy story writer, and he wrote many books, and a man of  
23 that type only needs a couple of little incidental type  
24 things to let his imagination run. I think it is a figment  
25 of his imagination.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page (Rev. 2-75) 344-0000

7600021711

410 East Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20001

1 Mr. Baron. Why do you think he came up with your name?

2 Mr. Pash. Well, because I had the special unit, I  
3 presume.

4 Now, I don't think this is the business of the Committee  
5 at all. I mean, I don't think it is your interest, but I  
6 see more to it than just Hunt's interest of getting publicity,  
7 where there's a tie-in with the Oppenheimer situation, too.

8 Now, Hunt at the time, people in the CIA didn't know, at  
9 least I don't think they knew of my involvement in the investi-  
10 gation of that espionage case on the Pacific Coast. So why  
11 would he be informed by anyone that I was conducting an investi-  
12 gation on espionage, and it never was referred to as the  
13 Oppenheimer case until it came out. We had a code name for  
14 it, and nobody until after World War II knew that it involved  
15 an Oppenheimer situation.

16 Mr. Baron. What was that code name?

17 Mr. Pash. DSM Project.

18 Mr. Baron. For the record, we are discussing now an  
19 article that appeared in the Dallas Times-Herald by Thomas Horn  
20 which is copyrighted 1975, Chicago Sun-Times, and it appeared  
21 on December 30th, 1975.

22 Mr. Pash. In the Dallas newspaper.

23 Mr. Baron. Right.

24 And we should enter this as Exhibit 2 in our record.

25 (The document referred to was

marked as Pash Exhibit No.

2 for identification.)

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 Mr. Baron. While we're on this subject, is there anything  
2 else you would like to say about the account in this article  
3 that is headlined "Hunt Says Boris Pash Oppenheimer Accuser."

4 Is there anything else that you'd like to add to set  
5 the record straight on that article?

6 - Mr. Pash. Well, I was never the security officer or a  
7 security officer in the Manhattan Project. I conducted  
8 security operations for the Manhattan Project, but I was  
9 doing that as an Army Intelligence Officer assigned to the Fourth  
10 Army in Western Defense Command. I don't quite understand this.

11 Would you be kind enough to tell me in your opinion, here  
12 in this paragraph before the last, who was the superior officer --  
13 who is superior to whom there?

14 Mr. Baron. The sentence you're referring to says "in a  
15 memo based in part on Pash's work, his superior, Peor de Silva,  
16 accused Oppenheimer of playing a key part in Soviet efforts  
17 to learn about the atom bomb."

18 I can't interpret the article any better than you can, I'm  
19 afraid.

20 Mr. Pash. To put it straight, de Silva was a Lieutenant  
21 who came into my office in '42 shortly after graduating from  
22 Hunt Point, and he was put on -- I was then Chief of Counter-  
23 intelligence in the Fourth Army in Western Defense Command, and  
24 he was working at the Communist Desk, and I had him reviewing  
25 some of the reports and asked him to prepare a memorandum.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

46

1 His memorandum was a very well prepared memorandum. The material  
2 was very well analyzed, and it was always my practice, which  
3 probably is not always common in the military service, whenever  
4 a subordinate prepares a very good paper, I did not then have  
5 the paper prepared for the signature of the commanding officer.  
6 What I did in this case, I put a covering letter on it sending  
7 it to the War Department so that de Silva would get credit for  
8 his work rather than I getting credit for the work that de Silva  
9 did. That was my common approach to things, you see, because  
10 when a young officer does something good you want to be sure  
11 his name is recorded there.

12 So de Silva was really one of the men working within my  
13 division, and his responsibility was to analyze that. That is  
14 straightened out.

15 Of course, again, there is another statement, and I'll  
16 ask whether the Committee would be interested in this or not,  
17 but since it's been stated here, it says Oppenheimer's security  
18 clearance was lifted by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953.  
19 He was officially exonerated in 1963 when President Lyndon  
20 Baines Johnson awarded him the highest honor of the Atomic  
21 Energy Commission, the Enrico Fermi medal and a \$50,000 prize.  
22 That was not an exoneration. He received the prize for his  
23 scientific work. That had nothing to do at all with his  
24 security status.

25 Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that you would like to

~~TOP SECRET~~

the record on the New York Times interview with Howard Hunt?

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Perhaps we should go -- we should stop for a moment and go through the formalities of administering the oath Senator Schweiker. Would you stand, Colonel, and raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you have already given and are about to give to this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Pash. I do.

Senator Schweiker. Colonel, who would handle double agent problems under the set-up when you were there?

Mr. Pash. If I may just say there were two divisions, there were maybe more. There was the research and analysis, but there was the Plans and Policy division, and within the Plans and Policy Division were the planning branches, and I had Planning Branch 7 in the Plans and Policy Division. Then there was the Operational Division where all the operations, the actual operations were planned and conducted.

I only can say that based on the organization, the planning for that type of thing certainly would be as far as I know in the Operations Division because that was a detail, you see.

Senator Schweiker. How would we handle double agent problems, from your knowledge?

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 Mr. Pash. Well, if you want just theoretical, there are  
2 many ways that they could be handled. One is you give a double  
3 agent some information which the enemy knows is false and you  
4 let him carry it back, and the enemy would catch him at bringing  
5 back false information, you see. This is such as, you know,  
6 right off my head, as a reaction to your question, that is  
7 such a detailed and highly limited from the point of view of  
8 the way that things would be done, that you have to practically  
9 know the individual situation, you have to know the double  
10 agent, you would have to know his background, you would have  
11 to know your own operational group in detail in order to expose  
12 him to his own people, you see, and nobody sitting in Washington  
13 could ever develop a plan on how to have a double agent.

14        Somebody could write a book about it. I mean, theoretic-  
15        ally you could say, well --

16 Senator Schweiker. Where would it have to be done? You  
17 mean at the field level?

16 Mr. Pash. At the field level.

19 Senator Schweiker. And that would be under operations.

Mr. Pash. Yes, certainly it would be under operations, and it would be within the group that is handling the double agent because they know all the background to it.

23 Senator Schweiker. Now, when you say within the group,  
24 what kind of a structure would you call that? In other words,  
25 would this be a section?

1 Mr. Pash. I don't know what the organization in Europe was  
2 but for inst- 70, he mentions here -- and I am now just sort of  
3 speaking theoretically --

4 Senator Schweiker. It's a theoretical question I realize.

5 Mr. Pash. Say he mentions that he was with the Balkan  
6 unit. Now, the Balkan unit might have been an independent unit.  
7 I don't know. It could have been a part of the Eastern European  
8 unit, with a Balkan division within it.

9 Senator Schweiker. A geographical unit.

10 Mr. Pash. Now, the man in charge of operations into the  
11 Balkans really would be the person who would supervise the  
12 planning of an operation against a double agent.

13 Senator Schweiker. What is this?

14 Mr. Baron. This statement is -- this is Mr. Pash's  
15 statement. It's a four page statement that he has read into  
16 the record.

17 Senator Schweiker. Why would Howard Hunt say something  
18 like this?

19 Mr. Pash. Would you please take a look at that second  
20 one?

21 Mr. Baron. Senator Schweiker has just read the prepared  
22 statement of Mr. Pash, and we're now referring to the article  
23 in the Dallas Times-Herald that has been introduced as an  
24 exhibit already.

25 Mr. Pash. I am trying to analyze this myself, now, and I



don't mean to take the time of the Committee because I am not yet prepared to make a specific opinion, but here's the thing.

Senator Schweiker. Well, it helps us to get some of your thinking, that's all.

Mr. Pash. Well, there are two or three things that might be in back of this development. As I mentioned in my prepared statement, I am dedicated to intelligence. I think we need it. I think we are left very helpless without it.

Senator Schweiker. There is no question about that.

Mr. Pash. So when I found deficiencies in the CIA, I didn't hesitate to make it known. As a matter of fact, when I returned from Europe in 1953, General Fry who was then Chief of Personnel, told me informally that the Agency didn't particularly want me to be assigned to Washington. I do not hold that against the Agency. I know some people felt that I was too demanding of the intelligence service. When I operated in Italy in World War II, I gave a mission to the OSS to get an Italian scientist out of Rome before Rome fell because my mission was to get ahold of Dr. Amaldi, Giordani and Weck to see they knew anything about the German atomic development. That was my mission in World War II in Europe, and the OSS told me that they had dropped a radio man into Rome, and they made contact with Dr. Amaldi and that he's ready to come out, but the OSS doesn't have the capability of getting him out because they need a submarine.

51

**WITNESSES:** James L. E. Thompson, D.C., 1906

23 So I returned to the states, and they still had that  
24 operation to conduct, and then it was decided to send a  
25 permanent mission that I commanded to Europe, and when I was

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

82

1 In London I got a quick message to get down to Italy because  
2 Rome was about to fall. I entered Rome with the advance elements  
3 that were attacking Rome, and I went right to Amaldi's place  
4 and I picked him up, and I apologized to him for not -- for  
5 causing all this inconvenience and danger, and he says, what  
6 inconvenience. And I said, well, our agents contacted you. And  
7 he said, nobody ever contacted me.

8 And that evening when I already had Amaldi and had him  
9 secure, he came to me because I told him not to leave Rome  
10 without my permission, because he had to go to Naples, and  
11 my base was in Naples, and I said why, and he said, well,  
12 there's an officer downstairs who told me I had to go. And  
13 I said, no, you don't have to go. I'll go down and talk to  
14 the officer.

15 And this officer, a big husky fellow in a captain's  
16 uniform starts telling me I was interfering with a very impor-  
17 tant mission of the United States directed by the President  
18 himself, and I said what's happened. And he said, I have to  
19 take Dr. Amaldi and take him to Naples. And I said, why are you  
20 taking him to Naples. He said, I have to turn him over to the  
21 Alamo Mission. I'll tell you because you're interfering. And  
22 I says, you're looking at the Alamo Mission.

23 And I told him if I ever saw him in Rome I would prefer  
24 charges, just to scare him.

25 Well, I wrote about that in my book. I had a book out

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 on the operations of the Alanco Mission, and now I find out that  
2 Hunt might have been associated with the Balkan Desk. He might  
3 have been then in the OSS, and I might have hurt the guy's  
4 feelings or something. I have no way of knowing it.

5 I later found out, talking to some former OSS man, was  
6 bragging and telling some people how they got, they hoodwinked  
7 the Army and got a submarine and used to go up on operations  
8 which amounted to a picnic up there, and I said, well, I'm  
9 glad to find out at last what happened to my submarine.

10 Well, things like that I criticized heavily, and whether  
11 or not -- at first I thought maybe it was something else, but  
12 when I see there Hunt had nothing to do with the Oppenheimer  
13 situation. He didn't know about it. I don't think he knew about  
14 it until after the investigation broke, because no one knew  
15 what I was doing then, I mean that particular activity.

16 There is something behind this which of course because of  
17 my maybe overdedication and at the same time my knowledge, I  
18 feel I have reasonably good knowledge of the system of the  
19 Soviet Union and the way it works, but some people might be  
20 unwittingly duped. I don't say that, you know, this is  
21 intentional, but somewhere along the line somebody is saying  
22 well, let's muddy this business some more, you see, and whether  
23 Hunt gets paid for this or what, or whether somebody might  
24 ask him to cook up some stories, I don't know. I would like to  
25 find out.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 For instance, who initiated the interview? Did Hunt call  
2 up the newspaper and say come on down, I have a story for you?  
3 Or did somebody go down there and say can you give us another  
4 story, something you might think of, you know. I think some  
5 of those things are very important to know to find out what's  
6 behind this, because this is a lie. I mean, I might say to  
7 you, you know, somebody could say you're old enough to forget  
8 things or something like that, or you know, that my memory  
9 might not be clear, but some things that I lived through, like  
10 this --

11 Senator Schweiker. Are etched in your memory.

12 Mr. Paul. Yes.

13 So why this is taking place I don't know, and I think that --  
14 and certainly it's probably not the business of this Committee,  
15 but I think somebody should be trying to see what's behind  
16 some of these things which we know, you know, which we know  
17 are not accurate. Is it right?

18 Of course, I don't deny some of it probably is true  
19 because you get eight balls everywhere, and considering that it  
20 came out from those groups, there were too many unprincipled  
21 people in OSS. Many of them might have just carried over into  
22 CIA. Agents who worked for me on for instance the Oppenheimer  
23 case, you haven't heard any of them saying anything. They  
24 were trained. They were dedicated. And if anybody of my  
25 former associates in which I had some supervisory position wants

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

18

1 to say something, they usually call me, in the past years, you  
2 know, and said is it all right to talk now, you know. But there  
3 is -- we reached a period where this had become a lucrative  
4 past experience to have.

5 Senator Schweiker. And some of the people that are in  
6 jail are making a profit out of it. There's no question about  
7 it.

8 Mr. Pash. Well, yes, quite so.

9 Senator Schweiker. By selling their book or their story.

10 Mr. Pash. And as I mentioned before, in the early days  
11 of World War II and sort of into a carryover, we were inex-  
12 perenced in intelligence. I was called in and I probably had  
13 a little more experience than the average reserve officer  
14 because of my past experience in World War II and post-World  
15 War II interest in Europe, but we all were -- and I include  
16 myself -- we all had to train while we operated.

17 In other words, it's like taking a man with a lathe and  
18 giving him a guidebook and saying okay, start working, but  
19 be sure you read everything first. And as you go along you  
20 will gain a little more experience and will be a little faster.

21 Well, that was the situation, and that's the situation with  
22 our intelligence activities when they more or less, after the  
23 urgent need is over, then we feel we can dispense with much  
24 of it, and then if something happens, you cannot pick up  
25 intelligence in a short period of time, and particularly now

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

1 that it is highly subjected to our modern technology.

2 So anyway --

3 Senator Schweiker. Well, I appreciate that.

4 Mr. Pash. I don't want to stand on the soap box too  
5 long.

6 Senator Schweiker. Well, I asked you the question. I  
7 think that's a fair answer.

8 Is there anything else?

9 Mr. Baron. I just had one detail question.

10 Do you know a man named Colonel Milton Buffington?

11 Mr. Pash. I don't even think he was retired. Maybe he  
12 retired from the reservon, yes, Buffington.

13 Mr. Baron. In the Emergency Planning Office at the CIA?

14 Mr. Pash. By personal opinion of him is that he is in  
15 the field of intelligence, he was incompetent.

16 Mr. Baron. He was not your superior during this period of  
17 time?

18 Mr. Pash. At some time, I think when they reorganized, or  
19 in some respect, I really don't know. I never thought much  
20 of the man. I think he was transferred from Veterans Administr-  
21 tion to CIA when they had some vacancies, and some spots.

22 Whether he was an experienced officer in intelligence, I  
23 personally never felt that he was a strong man.

24 Mr. Baron. And he was not your supervisor at PH7, or was  
25 he?

1 Mr. Pash. I really don't recall what his position was.  
2 He was in that plans group.

3 Now, whether we all had a senior supervisor or not, I'm  
4 not sure. Maybe he was the coordinator or something like that.

5 Mr. Baron. Was there a period between the end of PD7 and  
6 the time when you left the CIA where you did other things at  
7 the Agency?

8 Mr. Pash. Yes.

9 Mr. Baron. And what did you move on to after PD7?

10 Mr. Pash. There was -- I really don't recall the  
11 designation of the unit. I think it concerned Eastern European  
12 planning because most of my activity after that, which practically  
13 was 1951, and there was a unit, a group of people of Russian  
14 background in South America that the Agency was interested in  
15 trying to contact and utilize.

16 I went down to South America to contact the leader of that  
17 group, the head of that group. It was a reasonably large group  
18 assembled together by -- by assemble I mean not physically but  
19 associated together because of their service in post-World War  
20 I, fighting the Communists. They were in some particular  
21 element somewhere, I think, on the front, on the Polish front  
22 or something like that, and they sort of stuck together, and it  
23 was to utilize them, to discuss with them the possibility of  
24 supporting them, using them.

25 When I got back I went to Central America to look for a

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

1 training site.

2 Mr. Baron. Maybe I can just summarize my interest in  
3 this period of time. You didn't -- after the time that you  
4 left PH7 and while you were still involved with the Agency,  
5 you didn't deal in any way with double agent problems, did you?

6 Mr. Pash. No. Then it was just strictly, I went to  
7 South America and I went to Central America to look for a  
8 training site, and I went to Alaska on another planning activity,  
9 to plan for activities relating to our interest in trying to  
10 establish some intelligence collecting organization within the  
11 Alaskan Command.

12 Mr. Baron. So the incident that Howard Hunt described in  
13 is no more likely to have come up during this period of time  
14 than when you were in PH7.

15 Mr. Pash. No.

16 Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.

17 I want to thank you for coming.

18 Senator Schweiker. I concur. We thank you for your  
19 cooperation and for coming in and talking to the Committee.

20 Mr. Pash. I had one request that I'd like to convey to  
21 you, and that is my friends are beginning to show some reason --  
22 some reasonable question about whether I am the type of person  
23 that they might feel they would be safe with, associating  
24 with me, and there are those guarded comments and word of  
25 trying to excuse my part and so forth, and then of course, I

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 don't put it past some crazy Albanian trying to get even with.  
2 me, because that can happen, you know, in this country. So I  
3 would like that when the Committee is satisfied with this, and  
4 particularly with my prepared statement, if you have means to  
5 have it given to the press, to give it the same distribution  
6 that those accusations had come in on because I'm getting calls  
7 from all over the United States.

8 Senator Schweiker. Well, let me ask you this. I can see  
9 your problem in view of what you told us, and what we see in the  
10 paper. I don't think the Committee --

11 Let's go off the record.

12 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the  
13 above-entitled matter was concluded.)

14 - - -

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25