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PROJECT MATTERHORN
JAMES FORRESTAL RESEARCH CENTER
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, N.J.
MAIL: P.O. BOX 451, PRINCETON, N.J.

~~D00036336~~

PUBLICLY RELEASABLE
OS-6 *V. Long* 11-9-93

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

D00038858

March 3, 1953

CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED
DOE OFFICE OF CLASSIFICATION

Cover Letter
~~VERIFIED UNCLASSIFIED~~

V. Long, OS-6, 11-9-93

Mr. Thomas Lovering
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Trenton, New Jersey

Dear Mr. Lovering:

I transmit to you a report on a security incident prepared at the request of yourself and Mr. Charles Lyons of the F.B.I. By reason of including the requested details the report is necessarily classified as SECRET in the sense of the Atomic Energy Act. My authorization in giving it to you and to Mr. Lyons is:

(a) The oral request of Commissioner Thomas Murray to myself over the phone 10:30 a.m. Saturday, 14th February, to render all possible assistance to a renewed investigation of the incident and in particular to give whatever information I could to Mr. Charles Bates, Mr. Charles Lyons of F.B.I., and their delegates.

(b) The written statement sent to Matterhorn 29 April 1952 by Mr. Robert Kirkman, Security Director for New York Operation Office, at my request, which listed you among the six F.B.I. agents "to be used on assignments necessitating access to restricted data or exclusion areas".

Many thanks for your continuing help on this investigation.

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This document contains Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Unauthorized disclosure subject to Administrative and Criminal Sanctions.

Sincerely yours,

| DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| 1 st Review Date: 08/18/2015 | 1. DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S)) |
| Authority: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DC <input type="checkbox"/> DD | 1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED |
| Name: Steven Brickfield | 2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: |
| 2 nd Review Date: 8/18/2015 | 3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO |
| Authority: DD | 4. COORDINATE WITH: |
| Name: K. Scheffter | 5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELED |
| | 6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED |
| | 7. OTHER (SPECIFY): |

John A. Wheeler

JAW:JOM

Enc.

Cy 1A - T. Lovering

2A - G. Dean ✓

4A - W. Borden

4A - N. Bradbury

4A - J. A. Wheeler

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PM-87

LOSS OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. WHEELER,
Project Matterhorn, Princeton, New Jersey, to
F.B.I. Agents Charles Lyons and Thomas Lovering
3 March 1953

The loss of a classified letter from Mr. John Walker was reported to the Joint Congressional Committee orally at the earliest possible moment, 8:30 a.m. Wednesday, 7 January 1953 and in writing to the J.C.C. on the same day a few hours later. That written report is now supplemented and essentially replaced by the present more extensive report, written at the request of Mr. Lyons and Mr. Lovering, to summarize answers given to extensive questions, not only about the incident itself, but also about background material that might shed light on the problem. The nature of the report is therefore set by the questions that were asked, not by any desire of the writer to be expansive. Insofar as there are any slight differences between times as stated here and in the earlier report, the present report is probably the more accurate. However, despite all effort to recall every detail, it is conceivable that even the present report is subject to amendment. However, everything is reported as accurately as it can be remembered.

John A. Wheeler

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1. Nature of Project Matterhorn.

Project Matterhorn was conceived as a way to help overcome the shortage of theoretical manpower that ~~the Los Alamos weapons program~~ the Los Alamos ~~had hampered~~. It succeeded in bringing to Princeton a number of able young men in theoretical and mathematical physics, who were willing to participate in the weapons program as members of the Princeton physics community, but not willing to go to Los Alamos. Calculations at Matterhorn had by early January 1952 established, in so far as calculations could establish that fact, the feasibility and combustibility of the main charge ultimately tested November 1, 1952. On the basis of these January 1952 results and other considerations the decision was made at Los Alamos in January 1952 to proceed with the construction of a gadget built along the lines of these calculations, rather than an alternative gadget which had also been considered up to that time. Calculations since that date have dealt in further detail with the functioning of the Ivy device and have assessed and compared with each other a number of possible alternative new devices, one of which in particular has been strongly recommended for an early test (teletype of December 12, 1952). The establishment of Project Whitney at Berkeley in the summer of 1952 created another center for work in the weapons field. This step, and requests from that new project to make available there any theoretical talent willing to go to Livermore, forced reconsideration of the Matterhorn program of long range weapon possibilities and relative assessment of advantages of one weapon compared to another. It was also apparent that Project Matterhorn had had since its beginning an emergency character which could not be continued indefinitely within a university set-up under peacetime conditions. Night and Sunday work was continuously being called for from several members of the Project. Deadlines set up by the group were continually having to be met. Opportunities for research and development of scientific potentialities were, as a result, less for individuals of the Project than for the average member of any AEC national laboratory. Pay scales, on the other hand, were substantially less than those of such laboratories. To have continued Matterhorn indefinitely would probably have required personnel-wise a set-up, still in the Princeton community, but probably quite different from the present one in its relation to the University. The initial initiative for the establishment of Matterhorn on an emergency basis having come entirely from one person who felt there was a nationally important problem to be solved, and no additional initiative having come in the meantime from the weapons program for the establishment of Matterhorn on a new and permanent basis, it was concluded to terminate Project Matterhorn about 1 March 1953. This date was fixed as a compromise between the late 1952 date when Livermore wished to secure interested Matterhorn personnel, and the spring 1953 date at which Princeton's academic year comes to an end. By this date Matterhorn will have completed the evaluation of weapons of the Ivy variety, especially those in which a fuel is employed having some advantages with respect to the fuel used in the Ivy shot.

Within Princeton University Project Matterhorn has operated on a non-departmental basis under the jurisdiction of a Management Committee, appointed by the President and chairmaned by Professor Lyman Spitzer, Jr. Professor John A. Wheeler has functioned as Project director.

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2. Contacts with the Joint Congressional Committee.

On March 5, 1952, a telephone call was made to the undersigned by Mr. John Walker, previously unknown to JAW or to any of the other members of Project Matterhorn. He asked if he might visit Project Matterhorn and become acquainted with its work. ~~He requested that the undersigned~~ clearance notification ~~be sent to him~~ through the AEC. Such clearance was subsequently transmitted ~~by the undersigned~~ the AEC Division of Military Applications and the visit then took place on March 6, 1952. / through

/He said that
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Mr. Walker's visit dealt with questions of feasibility of various types of thermonuclear weapons, relative level of effort on the several theoretical physics problems remaining to be solved in this field with the question how the shortage of theoretical talent in this field had ~~been~~ held back thermonuclear advance by the U.S., and with questions how soon Matterhorn would know enough about the feasibility of alternative thermonuclear fuel to permit sound judgments about related production plant construction. Mr. Walker's questions and discussion were definitely helpful to members of Project Matterhorn in their further thinking about their work. The ~~undersigned's~~ expression of appreciation from Washington for the importance for national defense of urgent ~~efforts~~ theoretical effort in the thermonuclear field provided, in addition, a real stimulus to everyone.

/the
A further visit by Mr. Walker on June 5, 1952 gave additional help in trying to put problems of thermonuclear program in proper perspective and additional help in judging the most fruitful direction for Matterhorn efforts to take.

Further conversations along the same lines were carried out at Eniwetok on occasion of the Ivy test.

Shortly before December 16 Mr. Walker telephoned to ask if he and Mr. John K. Mansfield, also of the staff of the Joint Congressional Committee, could visit Matterhorn to review with JAW a document on which he reported they were urgently occupied. JAW had to leave for Los Alamos at 6:48 p.m., December 17. That date appeared the only time available to review the document. Consequently, Mr. Walker and Mr. Mansfield brought the document to JAW at Matterhorn about 5:30 p.m., December 16. JAW read the rather long document that night. All of next day, the seventeenth, was spent in reviewing the document, and only about a half hour was available for bag packing and time to get train for Los Alamos.

The document turned out to be a conscientious and extremely illuminating review of U.S. effort and lack of effort in the thermonuclear field. JAW was asked to help in putting into better perspective points with which he was personally familiar. Doing so, and reviewing some of the organizational and personnel problems of the thermonuclear field, gave renewed concern about the U.S. rate of progress and renewed incentive to attempt to do the most in Matterhorn remaining months.

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3.

/Two days
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courier took

On the occasion of this conference Mr. Walker and Mr. Mansfield were shown JAW's December twelfth teletype regarding Matterhorn's results on a new thermonuclear fuel. /a copy of this teletype ~~was taken~~ to their office, along with the document which they had brought. ~~by the courier~~ The review of the document in question with Mr. Walker and Mr. Mansfield, and the accompanying discussions were carried out in JAW's closed office and were not referred to in subsequent discussions with other members of Matterhorn. This contrast with the earlier extensive contact with Matterhorn members was quite in keeping with the very different nature of the subject matter under discussion in this visit.

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A registered letter in an envelope headed, "Joint Committee on Atomic Energy," arrived the morning of Monday, January 5, but it reposed unopened in the safe at Project Matterhorn all day Monday and Tuesday, because too much was going on to allow time to open and read it.

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- as necessary part of Matterhorn job
4. Called to Washington/to participate in discussion of Project Ivy results with members of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and Naval Research Laboratory.

Los Alamos The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington had been an important/subcontractor to construct measuring equipment for the Ivy operation and to make complicated measurements on the neutron and gamma ray emission and other effects associated with the main shot. At operation Ivy by the end of the summer the Naval Research Laboratory group under Dr. Ernest Krause had got their observations reduced to a form where it was important to try to compare and correlate them with the Matterhorn calculations on weapon performance. Accordingly, Dr. Krause arranged a conference at Naval Research Laboratory to which representatives came from Los Alamos and were to come from Matterhorn. It was not until about 3:30 in the afternoon of Tuesday, January 6, that arrangements were finally concluded over the phone between JAW in Princeton and E. Krause in Washington as to who would probably go: Wheeler and Berger (if Berger were willing) from Princeton the first day of the meeting (Wednesday), and possibly Toll or Wilets or others from Princeton the second day. It seemed inadvisable for more people to be away from Princeton for a longer time because of the pressure of the calculations under way at Matterhorn.

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3. Occasion for letter from John Walker to John Wheeler.

In the course of his study into the history of U.S. thermonuclear work, Mr. Walker had found a reference to the notion of radiation implosion from the Klaus Fuchs period of thermonuclear work at Los Alamos around 1946 or 47.

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At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Walker expressed his interest in formulating the comparisons and distinctions between the various ideas more sharply than had heretofore been possible. He proposed his formulation on to JAW in some days and ask for reaction to it. Consequently, it was expected that a letter ~~had~~ come from Mr. Walker shortly after Christmas.
would

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4.

After JAW had found by contact with Berger that he was willing to go to the meeting the following day, Miss Margaret Murray, secretary at Project Matterhorn, called the local station of the Pennsylvania Railroad in Princeton to make reservations on the night sleeper from Philadelphia to Washington for both potential participants in the conference of the following day. Use of this night sleeper was in the past, and continues to be the standard practice of JAW as a means to get to meetings in Washington early in the morning, without loss of three hours of working time by going during the day. The meeting at NRL was scheduled to begin at 8 a.m., identical with the hour of commencement of a previous meeting there which JAW had attended some weeks before. This circumstance made it particularly to the point to go by train. A single sleeping car handles the Philadelphia to Washington night service. It had already been discovered on previous occasions that this sleeper has no roomettes; only upper and lower berths and a compartment. This compartment was sold to someone on the night in question. The Princeton railroad station did not have time to secure an answer on space to Washington before the close of business of Project Matterhorn on Tuesday, January 6, so JAW made plans to stop by the local ticket office on his way home.

5. Loss of document en route.

It is appropriate to begin this account by reciting details of the receipt of the document the preceding day. Mail for Project Matterhorn, both classified and unclassified, arrives at the Princeton Post Office under the address P. O. Box 451, which is listed under the name of Project Matterhorn. The Post Office gives up mail only to a restricted list of people, approved by Project Matterhorn, and in addition only to someone who has the key to the mail box. This key is kept within the guarded confines of Project Matterhorn with a mail sack which itself has a padlock and key. The guard does not have a key to the padlock. One key is kept by Miss Murray, the secretary at Project Matterhorn, and the other key is kept by the Princeton Post Office. The normal practice, as also on the morning of January fifth, was and continues to be for the guard to go the two miles into the Princeton Post Office about 9 a.m., and to get back with the mail about 9:30 a.m. Thereupon he departs and the mail bag is opened by Miss Murray. Registered mail having to do with the AEC she gives to the document custodian, Mrs. Chrystine Shack. All the operations of these two persons and all their normal work are carried on in the same room, where also the safes are kept. This room is next to and opens into JAW's office. In the mail on the morning of ~~the question~~ was of Jan. 5 the document in question from the Joint Congressional Committee. Miss Murray/~~reports~~ that the envelope bore on its outside the notation "personal", and that she gave it to the document custodian, Mrs. Shack, with the comment that Mrs. Shack should check with JAW how to handle. Mrs. Shack has a postal registry slip with a notation that the item in question was personal and that she gave it to JAW. JAW deposited the item in his safe without

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opening it -- or believes to have deposited it there without opening it. It is conceivable that this is the time at which he opened up the envelope, and inner envelope, and quickly looked through to spot the nature of the item, but it is his best recollection that this examination was not carried out until approximately 4:50 p.m. Tuesday. The letter bore the classification "SECRET"

Following the approximately 3:30 p.m. Tuesday afternoon phone conversation with E. H. Krause, at Naval Research Laboratory, which made a trip to Washington seem necessary, JAW took out of his files a report of E. H. Krause basic to discussions of the following day and a summary of Matterhorn calculations from which all classified notations had been cut out with a razor blade prior to JAW's trip to Eniwetok at the end of November. JAW inserted these two reports in a brown manila envelope at the end of the day. Realizing that Mr. Walker's letter was urgent and would soon have to be answered, and not seeing how time would be secured to make the answer in the press of things at Matterhorn, JAW decided to use the occasion of the visit to NRL to telephone Mr. Walker, or in some other way to seek an opportunity to return the document to him with any appropriate comment, the arrangements to this end not yet being at all thought out and Krause's conference being regarded as the overriding item for the following day.

JAW, therefore, removed the envelope from Mr. Walker from his files about 4:50 p.m. Tuesday, January 6. The outer envelope was torn off and thrown away. The inner envelope was opened, JAW riffled through the pages of Mr. Walker's letter to gain an impression of the subject matter, and decided that he ought indeed to see if some way could not be arranged in the course of the meetings the following day to get this material back to Mr. Walker with appropriate comments. JAW signed out for this document on the calendar pad of the document custodian, having already signed out there for Krause's report. This sign-out was in accordance with the rules at Project Matterhorn. Krause's report had already been signed out by the document library (one set of safes) to JAW (retention in JAW's safe), so the responsibility for the Krause report, like that for Mr. Walker's letter, was on JAW. However, in addition to this sign-out, Matterhorn rules require that a person who has to take a classified document on a trip should leave a notation with the document librarian as to material taken. The calendar pad sheet in question was given into the custody of Mr. Charles Lyons of FBI on February 20. JAW placed the Walker letter in the same manila envelope which contained the Krause report and the unclassified Matterhorn document and closed the envelope by bending over the metal tabs to secure the flap. JAW's normal classified material was placed in the safe in the usual manner and locked up as all other safes are at the close of the working day by the secretary or document custodian, or both. The manila envelope now contained two secret reports and one unclassified report.

5 p.m. Forrestal Research Center bus was taken to Princeton and was left at corner of College Road and University Place, about one-half block from Princeton railroad station. JAW went there, checked that reservation had been secured on Philadelphia-Washington night sleeper for self and Berger and bought his own coach ticket for the route Princeton-Princeton

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Junction-Trenton-Philadelphia and first-class ticket and pullman ticket for Philadelphia-Washington leg. During this transaction JAW had manila envelope lying on marble ledge of ticket counter with one hand over manila envelope.

About 5:20 p.m. JAW took manila envelope and tickets from railroad station one half block to Studebaker garage to pick up car which had been serviced during day. To best of recollection car was sitting in street with keys over visor. Drove one mile home from station with envelope sitting on seat in car beside self. Picked up wife, according to previous arrangement, to go to home of Professor S. Bochner, one quarter mile from home, in pursuance of Bochner invitation to stop in for sherry before their forthcoming departure for California. JAW held envelope during this visit of about three quarter hour duration at Bochner home. Contents of envelope were not discussed, but obvious presence of envelope led into discussion of clearance investigations (Professor Bochner had been cleared for, and had participated in Project Matterhorn.). There was no occasion to discuss any classified information nor would it have been possible, as the place was not appropriate and, in addition, Mrs. Bochner is not cleared.

About 6:30 p.m. returned homewith wife and document, had dinner, bag. /This pocket is sewed to cover of
/having securepacked suitcase, and at approximately 8:35 p.m. called Blackie Taxi. Bag
atch but no is approximately 5" x 15" x 2 1/2". Manila envelope containing documents was
key lock placed in pocket, inside bag, ~~manila envelope containing documents~~ /Contents/ included /of bag
/read matter. It was the intention to ~~discuss~~ most, if not all, of this matter /also
on the coach sectors of the trip to and from Washington. The material ~~was~~ classified
consisted of ~~copies~~ reprints, copies of Science magazine, the Economist, and the Physical
Review. The classified material was not referred to between 4:50 p.m. & 10:10 p.m.

It was necessary to sit in the coach of the Princeton-Princeton Junction shuttle train about five minutes before the 8:56 p.m. departure of that train. JAW occupied about the fifth seat from the rear on the left-hand side, sat with bag on his knees forming a work table, going through some of the reading material he had brought along. ~~Neither on this leg, nor on either of the other two legs of the coach trip, was the brown envelope opened or removed from its special place within the bag.~~ However, it was easy to see, and was seen on raising the lid, that the envelope rested in its proper place.

The only other passengers on the shuttle were a middle aged couple on the right-hand side, about eight seats from the rear, and a drunken colored woman in the forward part of the car performed various antics in the aisle to the obvious embarrassment of this couple. On arrival at Princeton Junction, about 9:01 p.m., JAW looked through the waiting room window and saw inside Dr. Jay Berger, obviously en route to the next morning's conference with Krause. To avoid getting into conversation with him, which would destroy the working utility of the trip from Princeton Junction to Philadelphia, JAW refrained from going in and instead

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sheltered himself from the wind in a rarely used doorway of the waiting room. There was a wait of about five minutes in this location.

On arrival of the 9:06 p.m. connection to Trenton JAW waited in the shadow of this doorway until it seemed likely that all potential passengers for Trenton, including Berger, had boarded train and then climbed up steps at rear of last car which was either empty or practically empty and took seat about third from rear. Again sat with suitcase on knees; used it as work table to review more of accumulated literature. The manila envelope was in clear sight but not touched.

On arrival at Trenton, about 9:17 p.m., JAW waited to leave train until after practically all passengers had time to get out and then went rapidly with head down to rear (east) end of westbound waiting room. Set suitcase again on knees and proceeded as before. There were two or three colored people in the vicinity. The manila envelope could be seen when the suitcase lid was raised, but this envelope was not handled.

On arrival of New York-Trenton-Philadelphia train, about 9:29 p.m., boarded coach trying to be inconspicuous so as to avoid recognition by Berger. Coach was occupied by a number of long distance passengers with much baggage. JAW took a seat about fifth from rear on lefthand side next to woman sitting there. Reopened bag, withdrew more material to be reviewed, reclosed bag again setting it on knees as working surface, and continued occupied until arrival at 30th Street, Philadelphia, approximately 10:06 p.m. / JAW restored his yet ~~unseen~~ material to suitcase, carried it in hand and overcoat on arm, and proceeded as rapidly as possible to information counter in center of grand concourse of Philadelphia station where tickets were given to conductor of night train and pullman stub was returned entitling passengers to board night sleeper. Walked rapidly to stairway 1. Saw porter of night sleeper, said "lower 9 car 101". Let porter carry bag to berth but followed close behind. Long run experience shows that porter gets quite upset if he is not allowed to carry something to the berth.

unread

Hung up overcoat on hanger toward foot of berth, in accordance with normal practice. Believes to have gone to men's room at this point as did not go at any other time since departure from Princeton. / Believes / Took bag to remember that men's lounge was empty and that this made it possible to keep door between lounge and toilet proper open with bag sitting on sill between the two, as bag itself could not be accommodated in toilet. Returned with bag to berth, stopping on way at water fountain in corridor to get drink.

Set bag on far (right) side of berth, away from aisle, next to window. Stood on aisle, removed jacket and shoes and necktie, placed jacket over hanger, near head of berth, with front of jacket (containing wallet) facing toward berth. Do not remember whether shirt was removed while standing in aisle or after sitting in berth. Buttoned the row of double buttons with double layer of cloth from top to bottom, undressed, lay trousers on shelf at foot of berth, hung shirt over jacket with front of shirt facing towards aisle (normal practice to increase difficulty of getting at wallet should someone slit curtain. Removed pajamas from suitcase which lay between passenger and window. Approximate time 10:15 p.m.

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8.

Decided in view of 8 a.m. commencement of Krause's conference that only chance to review Krause document and Walker letter would be at this time. Removed brown manila envelope from pocket attached to top of suitcase, bent up metal fastener, raised flap, and removed Walker letter as the most interesting, though not technically so important item. Receipt forms accompanied letter, but JAW does not recall whether they were clipped to the letter at this point or separate from it. JAW read document once through and concluded that several points required clarification. Reached for pencil and removed it from its normal position in shirt pocket. This movement required reaching around the jacket-shirt combination hanging on the coat hanger. Made pencil notations in margins of document and completely rewrote at least one sentence. The two readings of the document and the making of pencil notations required roughly twenty minutes. Approximate time of completion was, therefore, around 10:35 p.m. Believe to have replaced Walker letter and receipt forms in brown manila envelope, either before or after withdrawing Krause document from this envelope. This was the last time that passenger saw Walker letter prior to discovering its loss about 7:10 a.m.

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Returned Krause document to envelope, closed flap, bent over tabs, put manila envelope back in pocket of suitcase, put pencil inside of suitcase instead of returning it to normal position in shirt pocket, closed suitcase, set it up on ledge next to window. (Looked at watch; about 11 p.m. as compared to normal time of going to sleep about 10 p.m.) Snapped out light. Went to sleep. Sleeping car left Philadelphia at 2:43 a.m. and reached Washington at 5:15 a.m. JAW was awakened a couple of times in night, presumably by train movement, and with leg felt suitcase in place between self and window.

Awoke around normal rising time of 6:45 a.m., put on trousers and shoes, still keeping on pajama top (suitcase not opened during this operation), removed shirt and jacket from hanger, picked up suitcase, looked over berth to make sure that nothing had been left there, went to men's lounge, placed suitcase flat on leather cushion nearest door, hung jacket on hook immediately above this cushion, placed shirt over and around jacket as protection to wallet during visit to toilet. Hands now empty. Opened suitcase, removed brown manila envelope and shaving things from suitcase, placed shaving things on wash basin closest to toilet to reserve wash place against expected arrival of other passengers, left suitcase unsnapped but closed it. Entered toilet, placed brown manila envelope in only available place short of laying it on floor: in vertical position next to wall between steam pipes and wall, closed door having observed that a passenger was just coming into men's lounge. Finished in toilet. Opened toilet door. Came out and washed hands in wash basin close to door. By now self and three passengers in lounge room. One of three passengers immediately entered toilet. Toilet door clicked. At this moment JAW, just

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8.

Decided in view of 8 a.m. commencement of Krause's conference that only chance to review Krause document and Walker letter would be at this time. Removed brown manila envelope from pocket attached to top of suitcase, bent up metal fastener, raised flap, and removed Walker letter as the most interesting, though not technically so important item. Receipt forms accompanied letter, but JAW does not recall whether they were clipped to the letter at this point or separate from it. JAW read document once through and concluded that several points required clarification. Reached for pencil and removed it from its normal position in shirt pocket. This movement required reaching around the jacket-shirt combination hanging on the coat hanger. Made pencil notations in margins of document and completely rewrote at least one sentence. The two readings of the document and the making of pencil notations required roughly twenty minutes. Approximate time of completion was, therefore, around 10:35 p.m. Believe to have replaced Walker letter and receipt forms in brown manila envelope, either before or after withdrawing Krause document from this envelope. This was the last time that passenger saw Walker letter prior to discovering its loss about 7:10 a.m.

Reviewed Krause document to get straight particularly as to geometry of the several experimental holes and the relative intensity of the radiation through them. Returned Krause document to envelope, closed flap, bent over tabs, put manila envelope back in pocket of suitcase, put pencil inside of suitcase instead of returning it to normal position in shirt pocket, closed suitcase, set it up on ledge next to window. (Looked at watch; about 11 p.m. as compared to normal time of going to sleep about 10 p.m.) Snapped out light. Went to sleep. Sleeping car left Philadelphia at 2:43 a.m. and reached Washington at 5:15 a.m. JAW was awakened a couple of times in night, presumably by train movement, and with leg felt suitcase in place between self and window.

Awoke around normal rising time of 6:45 a.m., put on trousers and shoes, still keeping on pajama top (suitcase not opened during this operation), removed shirt and jacket from hanger, picked up suitcase, looked over berth to make sure that nothing had been left there, went to men's lounge, placed suitcase flat on leather cushion nearest door, hung jacket on hook immediately above this cushion, placed shirt over and around jacket as protection to wallet during visit to toilet. Hands now empty. Opened suitcase, removed brown manila envelope and shaving things from suitcase, placed shaving things on wash basin closest to toilet to reserve wash place against expected arrival of other passengers, left suitcase unsnapped but closed it. Entered toilet, placed brown manila envelope in only available place short of laying it on floor: in vertical position next to wall between steam pipes and wall, closed door having observed that a passenger was just coming into men's lounge. Finished in toilet. Opened toilet door. Care out and washed hands in wash basin close to door. By now self and three passengers in lounge room. One of three passengers immediately entered toilet. Toilet door clicked. At this moment JAW, just

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preparing to shave, suddenly realized that he had left brown manila envelope in toilet two feet from where standing while using wash stand. Thought quickly what to do. Despite presence of two other passengers in lounge room, climbed up over wash stand and looked down through ventilating grill near ceiling which connects toilet and lounge room. Impossible to see brown manila envelope through that angle. Did observe passenger unrolling paper and no sign that he was occupied with brown manila envelope. Immediately after his coming out of toilet, perhaps three minutes later, JAW rushed in, got envelope which still had metal tabs folded to close flap, and placed it on wash stand before him. Attention was so concentrated on getting into toilet that no notice was paid to passenger coming out of toilet. Consequently it is not known whether the passenger in question was included in the two out of the original three passengers in wash room whom JAW had scrutinized particularly closely because of their unusual appearance, not because JAW had any suspicion that he had lost possession of the Walker letter. These two individuals had dark shirts, sallow complexions, black hair. Envelope stood on ledge at back of wash basin throughout shaving period.

On finishing shaving, restored shaving things and brown manila envelope into previous positions in suitcase, snapped suitcase shut, put on shirt, tie, and jacket. Was now, at perhaps 7:05 a.m., in position to leave train on collecting overcoat from berth. Went back to berth with suitcase, put on overcoat and scarf, but see no signs yet of Berger with whom it was the plan to go to Krause's conference. Went dressed in overcoat with bag from own lower berth 9 to section 6 which had been made up by porter and sat there with suitcase on knee waiting for Berger to appear. Impatient at time going by, opened suitcase and started to go through more of unclassified reading material which had to be disposed of. Berger passed by, perhaps 7:10 a.m., on way to wash room.

6. Steps taken following loss.

JAW decided to make check up on classified material and opened brown manila envelope about 7:15 or 7:20 a.m. Krause report and Matterhorn unclassified report there but Walker letter missing. Made thorough search of contents of brown manila envelope without finding it. In great haste began to go through all contents of the suitcase to check against possibility Walker letter had inadvertently been put there instead of brown manila envelope the night before. Still searching through this material and trying to form plan of action when Berger came by about 7:15 a.m. Asked him to stand guard over suitcase and contents. JAW then rushed to berth, searched it, rushed down corridor to wash room, searched through toilet and lounge room, including discarded papers and towels. Then got porter, who was assisting passengers off train (due to be moved out of Union Station at 7:30 a.m., but actually not moved out until 7:45 a.m.), to check through all linen for paper. Went over linen again with him second time. Went

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again through wash room. Removed all cushions from seat and back of sections 9 where I had slept and 6 where I had sat in morning searching for paper. Continued search until last minute before car moved out of station about 7:45 a.m. Got name of porter and information how to secure assistance of pullman lost and found.

Went with suitcase and Berger through all eating places in Union Station looking for two well remembered passengers who had been in wash room, hoping to establish contact with them and get guidance or assistance in search for missing paper, or at least their names and addresses. Found them neither in quick lunch counter, nor in either of two Gateway Restaurants in Union Station. Left Berger at Gateway breakfast counter guarding suitcase and ordering breakfast for two, and went to lost and found division in station where reported loss and emphasized importance of missing paper and asked that search be made for it. About 8:15 a.m. rejoined Berger at breakfast counter. Completed breakfast about 8:25 a.m. Already late for Krause conference. Had decided to abandon Krause conference until document situation was brought under control. Proceeded with Berger to Office of Joint Congressional Committee to report loss of document and review with appropriate authorities whatever could be done to regain control of it. Phoned Mr. John Walker from JCC offices. Joint Committee security officer, Mr. Frank Gotter, appeared in about five minutes. Situation was quickly reviewed with him. Suitcase was taken into guarded premises and all papers spread out for search through for missing letter. This was about the third search of these papers. Similar and more thorough searches were made in the course of the day.

Proceeded with Mr. Gotter and Mr. Berger to pullman yards, perhaps a mile from Union Station, and searched again in great detail through car without results, except to locate old issues of Science magazine and other already read material which JAW had discarded in period around 7:10 a.m.

Spent rest of day until about 3:30 p.m. at offices of JCC reviewing steps as above reported, answering questions, etc. Had called Krause in course of early morning to report that it was unlikely that JAW would be able to attend meeting. JAW left Washington at 4 p.m., arriving Princeton 7:15 p.m., and being met about 7:20 p.m. by F.B.I. agents, Mr. Thomas Lovering and associate, who with JAW went over material in home until about 9:30 or 10 p.m. In subsequent days there were further reviews with Mr. Lovering and associates, with Mr. Gordon Dean, and Mr. Boyer, General Manager of the AEC; and with Mr. Charles Lyons and associates.

7. Nature of document and its classification.

two The Walker document consisted of a covering letter from himself, of ~~many~~ pages of text in blue type on bond paper written in the same style as the more extensive document shown to me by Mr. Walker and Mr. Mansfield on December seventeenth and ~~one~~ pages of onion skin carbon copy material extracted from an earlier Report which had dealt, not with the thermonuclear

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program, but with the program of conventional atomic weapons. This material was classified as secret. This question has since been twice asked JAW whether the document in question should not have been classified as top secret. If JAW had been the originator of the document, and had been responsible for classifying it, in the light of instructions given on this subject by Los Alamos the document would have been classified in the same category as that which it actually had, secret. The four items which render a document top secret by Los Alamos standards* are: (a) Production rates of critical materials; (b) Complete description of an entire gadget including drawings with diagrams, electronic details, etc.; (c) Overall picture of U.S. atomic potential: such items as weapon stockpile, distribution of ready weapons among types, etc.; (d) Time schedule of dates at which U.S. will arrive at important and well defined steps in its military capability. By none of these standards did the document come into the top secret category.

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They are always classified as secret and sent to Los Alamos on this basis. The loss to enemy hands of any one of these monthly reports, like that of any other material classified secret would, of course, be a serious matter and, in particular, the loss of the walker letter is a serious item for U.S. national security.

8. Personal analysis of potential importance to an enemy power information in document.

A reconstruction of the Walker letter was brought to Princeton at JAW's request by Mr. Frank Cotter and Mr. Paul Hamilton of the staff of the Joint Committee on the afternoon of Friday, 27th February.

From the standpoint of potential revelation of information the most important parts of the document appear to be the following:

* JAW went over once again the question what makes a document top secret in a special discussion at Los Alamos on 17 February. The occasion was the question how to give the Project Matterhorn final report the broadest possible perspective without making it Top secret. Two associate directors of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Ralph Carlisle Smith and Darol Froman, gave the four stated criteria any one of which raised a document to the top secret category.

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JAW also reviewed the text to try to determine what pencil notes he made in the margin. It was difficult to gain a proper mental attitude for meditation about the letter and to reconstruct the atmosphere of freedom from interruption which had existed on the original reading of the document in the train, because of the press of things to do and interruptions at Project Matterhorn on the afternoon of February 27th. Consequently the following reconstruction of the original pencil notes is meant to be merely indicative of their general nature and not in any sense guaranteed to be a detailed repetition of what was written in the margin. These notations did not raise the classification of the document from secret to top secret. The notations were made by penciling through words in the text and drawing lines out to the margin and writing there the appropriate proposal or suggestion.

p.1 - cover letter - no notes believed to have been made.

p. 2 - first page of main text on bond paper - last paragraph on this page - JAW believes he made a half sentence marginal note on this paragraph, but does not now recall its nature since it is not directly suggested by the text. Also: Change "par" to "pure" in next to last sentence.

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The idea had not yet arisen to use radiation implosion, under somewhat different theoretical conditions, strongly to compress ..." Next paragraph - insert after Lithium-6; "discussed motives and methods for imploding the main charge of deuterium in the super;" (may have added also references to one or two other items in the report, but do not now remember whether, and if so, which.)

p. 4 - Carbon sheet; second paragraph of section dated April 4 - after "Dr. Teller in 1951" change rest of sentence to read "is difficult to trace or to compare with the possible course of Russian thinking." Next paragraph - respell "compressions".

p. 5 - Carbon page containing only one paragraph. Respell "compressors" as "compressions"; insert period after "implosion".

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13.

It is concluded that the following deductions could be drawn by a potential enemy who knows how to make conventional atomic bombs, but who has not yet cracked the thermonuclear field:

(1) U.S. is on the way to a successful thermonuclear weapon.

(2) There are several varieties of the thermonuclear weapon conceived to be practical.

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(4) Compression is useful.

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9. Conclusion.

(a) There is 99% probability that the document disappeared in pullman car 101 of the Pennsylvania Railroad between 10:30 p.m. Tuesday, January 6, and 7:15 a.m. Wednesday, January 7, as stated by JAW.

(b) The time and manner of the loss is not known, nor is it known whether the word theft is more or less appropriate than the word loss.

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(d) It is the conservative thing to assume that the information in question is indeed in the hands of a potential enemy, regardless of the alternative possibility of simple loss.

(e) Additional incentive, therefore, exists for the U.S. to increase its effort in the weapons field.

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- (1) U.S. is on the way to a successful thermonuclear weapon.
- (2) There are several varieties of the thermonuclear weapon conceived to be practical.
- (3) Lithium-6 is useful.
- (4) Compression is useful.
- (5) Radiation heating provides a way to get compression.

Of these points it would seem that the first four are probably known anyway to any intelligent group. Consequently the qualitative idea of radiation implosion -- whatever that may mean, for the text is not very specific -- is the most important revelation. It is difficult to assess the importance of this notion without knowing the present state of thinking of a Russian like Landau. The revelation could conceivably be very important indeed.

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(c) The possession of the document would give an enemy power the idea that U.S. advances in the thermonuclear field depend in an important way on getting high fuel compression via radiative implosion. Short of success of manifold espionage attempts a potential enemy can have no indication of the importance attached to these notions by the U.S. except through the earlier discussions in which Fuchs took part, or the qualitative deductions from newspaper reports of the past year and a half.

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(e) Additional incentive, therefore, exists for the U.S. to increase its effort in the weapons field.

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14.

Addendum: Past errors of omission and commission.

Mr. Charles Lyons of the F.B.I. requested that JAW should make the present statement to summarize answers made orally to questions asked by Mr. Lyons, Mr. Lovering, and other agents in the course of several past interviews. It is understood that compliance with this request makes it necessary also to include the answers given by JAW to the question: What losses or security violations can be recollected from past years?

(1) Misplacement of R.R. ticket. Could not be present at birth of baby in Baltimore March 31, 1942 because of pressure of atomic energy work in Chicago. Got away from meeting in great haste just in time to get a night reclining seat coach train to Baltimore. Lost return ticket for several hours, but finally recovered it on floor several hours later. No classified matter carried or involved.

(2) Injudicious reference to Niels Bohr in late 1943 or early 1944 in reply to question from firm of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. who had been in correspondence with Bohr before the war regarding publication of a book.

(3) Forgot to lock safe in own Los Alamos office during lunch period some time in 1950 or 1951.

(4) Los wallet out of rear pocket on trip between New Brunswick and New York about 1946 after paying conductor for ticket. Detected loss before leaving train but questioning of passengers failed to reveal its fate. Wallet contained stamped self addressed envelope and came back in mail about a week later, along with money it had contained. No classified matter carried or involved.

(5) In May 1951 at Eniwetok learned from Ralph Carlisle Smith that Act of Congress makes it illegal to take secret matter out of U.S. and that Eniwetok is not counted part of U.S. The last minute calculational results brought along for interpretation of observations, and classified as SECRET -- though stored in safe in guarded area after arrival -- had therefore been carried on the leg Honolulu-Eniwetok in unwitting contravention of regulations. After George shot the material was returned to the U.S. via special courier.

(6) December 12, 1952 teletype from JAW, taken to Washington for transmission to Norris Bradbury, erroneously classified by JAW as SECRET, when later review determined it was somewhat over the line and should have been TOP SECRET.

(7) Pass book containing Los Alamos and Argonne passes fell out of rear pocket of pants hanging on rack in closet of roomette going into Chicago, July 1953. Loss found on arrival at Argonne about 45 min. after leaving train. Pullman Co. recovered and returned passes as result of request made to them that morning. Classified matter not involved in the loss.

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15.

(8) December 1953, classified document taken home to read because that evening was only time available to read document and wife was in state where she ought not to be left. Document returned after reading to safe in guarded premises of Project Matterhorn 7:55 p.m. same evening.

(9) 23 Dec. 1953, left Christmas present (a booklet in washroom of Kansas City airport, about 6 a.m. Realized loss few minutes later, about time of boarding plane with overcoat and suitcase. Teletyped back from next stop 50 min. later but the Sears Roebuck booklet was not recovered. Classified material not involved in loss.

Project and personal research has required dealing with a great number of papers and documents since becoming on 15 Jan. 1939 the first person in the U.S. to work on fission; and has required working in many cases under great pressure, but no other significant incidents of the above variety are recalled.

At the suggestion of Mr. Lovering the following codicil is added. "This voluntary statement, consisting of 15 pages of text and a 1 page introduction, is given to T. S. Lovering, who has identified himself to me as a special agent of the F.B.I. He has advised me that I am entitled to counsel and that I do not have to give any statement unless I desire to, but that any statement I do choose to give can be used against me in court. This statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

Signed

John A. Wheeler

Witness

Thomas S. Lovering

3 March 1953

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